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JAPAN: ASIAN PEACEKEEPER OF THE 21ST
CENTURY?

by

William J. Young Jr

June, 1992

Thesis Advisor:

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JAPAN: ASIAN PEACEKEEPER OF THE 21ST CENTURY?

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of the requirements for the degree of


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
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
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ABSTRACT

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An understanding of Japanese domestic policy debates is vital in order for the United States to realize successfully her policy aims in the Asia-Pacific region. This study, sourced entirely from Japanese opinion leaders within the debate, serves to provide that insight.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War are two events which have had a significant impact on the thinking of Japanese scholars and analysts regarding the global and regional role their country should take. This has generated within the Japanese political right a debate between three schools of thought: the Status Quo school, directed towards maintaining Japan's current role and policies; a Neo Nationalist school advocating a role completely autonomous from the US; and a new Internationalist school which encourages significant change in the way Japan acts in the international arena, yet without leading to an autonomous role.

This thesis is an attempt to identify the contours, dynamics, and proponents of an emerging Internationalist school in Japanese foreign policy debates and assess its impact on future Japanese foreign policy.

No longer content with the mere bankrolling of other countries' development and tired of international criticism of Japan's mercantilist foreign policy, the post-WWII generation is attempting to forge out a new military and political role for Japan that is commensurate with her economic stature. Furthermore, the key for Japan to realize her expanded role

may lie in Southeast Asia. This is the core of the Internationalist perspective.

Why should this be of importance to the US? Japan is the United States' primary partner in the stability of the Asia-Pacific theater. Up to now, the major policy makers in the Japanese government have been the pre-WWII generation. These Status Quo figures are beginning to be replaced by the younger Internationalists. An excellent example is Japan's most-recent search for a new Prime Minister. Of the three candidates, two were older Status Quo politicians, but one candidate, Liberal Democratic Party General Secretary Ichiro Ozawa, was of the post-WWII Internationalist generation. As the Internationalists start to assume power in Japan, it is absolutely critical for the United States to recognize the change and have a detailed understanding of the Internationalists' foreign policy agenda.

Without understanding the motives behind the actions of one of her primary partners, the United States cannot hope to successfully realize her own policies. It is vital for the US to be aware of the various opportunities and problems presented by the possibility of Japan emerging in a new role as potential Peacekeeper in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the past year, an active debate has taken place within Japan regarding her security policy. Many politicians, scholars, and academics are arguing that Japan needs to shoulder a greater security role, not only within the confines

of Japanese territories and surrounding waters, but also in the international arena. Although security policy has been a subject of debate in Japan for the last twenty five years, the recent debate is significant in that many leading politicians have also joined in calling for a greater Japanese role. Member of Parliament (MP) Ichiro Ozawa, reputed to be the LDP's strongman, stated recently that Japanese troops should be allowed to engage in combat under UN auspices. [Ref. 1] Coming from a politician as influential and well known as MP Ozawa, such a statement is simply amazing, and would have been unthinkable a few short years ago. Another major change is that an international role outside of Japan's immediate territories and surrounding waters, is being urged by many Japanese opinion leaders. These changes will have a tremendous effect upon US policy regarding Japan.

This study focuses mainly upon Japanese opinion leaders. With the exception of Chapter IV, Japanese sources will be primarily used. As noted in the bibliography, the exceptions are used to outline the security environment confronting Japan since 1965. While the majority of the sources are magazine and journal articles originally published in Japanese and subsequently translated into English, the study will also consider articles published in English by Japanese writers. Also falling into this category are articles co-authored by Japanese writers.

As the objective is to synthesize Japanese opinion, content analysis is the primary methodology utilized. The limitations of this thesis are worth noting. First, the author speaks Japanese but he cannot read Japanese fluently, thereby restricting sources to translations. Second, translated articles are known to be destined for foreign readers, hence a bias may be present in the selection of articles for translation in published sources. Third, some of the translated articles are not complete translations. Finally, as with all translations, some degree of error in content and perspective must be assumed.

Chapter IV focuses upon several opinion leaders of Southeast Asia. This chapter will serve to argue that the people of Southeast Asia, if necessary, may now be willing to permit a Japanese security role in their environs. Therefore, articles published by their opinion leaders are the source of information used there.

The study is organized in the following manner. First, the evolution of Japan's security policy debate will be traced from 1965 to the present. Second, and most important, the current security policy will be addressed. Especially significant is the section dealing with the Internationalist school of thought. Third, the thoughts of other Asian opinion leaders will be studied, as any moves on Japan's part to increase her security role will be highly dependent upon the

understanding and support of her neighbors. Finally,
implications for US policy will be addressed.

II. EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The first question to consider is what is bringing about changes in Japan's security policy debate? The answer lies in the security environment surrounding Japan. More than anything else, external factors drive Japan's security policy. The purpose of this chapter is to look at the development of Japan's security policy since 1965, and relate different phases to external factors. The study will not focus upon specific events and tie them to changes. Rather, the overall security environment surrounding Japan has changed over the years; and it is these broad, sweeping changes which force Japan to adapt.

The chapter is divided into four general phases. Starting in 1965 with Japan's "coming out party," the Tokyo Olympics, the phases are divided as follows. Phase I is entitled "Security under Pax Americana," and lasts until the mid 1970's. The second phase, entitled "Detente and US Withdrawal from Asia," lasts from then until the 1980s. The third phase, "Cold War Revisited" lasts for about five years following that. The final phase, "Current Security Policy Debate", will be examined in Chapter III.

A. PHASE I: SECURITY UNDER PAX AMERICANA

The first phase starts with the 1965 Tokyo Olympics. This event broadcast to the world that Japan had taken her place among the leading industrialized nations. First, the world surrounding Japan must be examined. The US was the overwhelmingly dominant factor in the region, and in Japan's security picture. Safe as she was under the aegis of American military and political might, Japan indulged in unrealistic, theoretical debates over whether or not Japan should possess any forces. Opposition parties questioned the legality of having the Self Defense Forces. This utopian period saw the emergence of many "unarmed neutrality" advocates, [Ref. 2] likening Japan to the "Switzerland of the Orient." What most of these people conveniently forgot is that Switzerland maintained her neutrality by being very well armed.

Another factor which influenced Japan during this period was US involvement in the Vietnam War. Many Japanese were afraid of being drawn into that conflict by virtue of having US forces in Japan. Hence, a great many advocates favored distancing Japan from the US.

A look at various party platforms in 1966 regarding security policy for Japan is indicative of this utopian period. [Ref. 3]

1. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

a. *World Situation*

Although Japan has developed a free democracy, there are those within the country who would destroy the system in order to accomplish a Communist Revolution. Therefore, Japan's national security is very susceptible to external menaces. The Communist camp has greatly extended its influence in the world, not by virtue of their economic or social theories, but by their skill and coercion in elaborating strategies, tactics and organizing techniques. Recent events, however, have demonstrated that their totalitarian systems are difficult to achieve. One good example is the Sino-Soviet rift. Both Communist China and the Soviet Union have been approaching developing countries, trying to force them to leave the Free World. So far, all countries involved in the communist sphere have not succeeded in achieving economic success. This is in severe contrast to the Free World nations.

b. *National Security*

The peace and security of the world today is maintained by the collective security system. Should Japan turn towards a policy of neutrality, the entire system may be endangered by the corresponding misbalance of power. Especially dangerous is the concept of "unarmed neutrality." Nowhere in the entire world does such a country exist. Should

Japan adopt such an unrealistic policy, the country, extremely valuable but entirely defenseless, will be open to an attack by an enemy and completely destroyed. In order to maintain the security of the nation, the U.S./Japan Security Treaty must be maintained, and the Self Defense Forces strengthened.

2. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

a. World Situation

In the current international situation in Asia, the United States is the imperialist power invading and interfering by force. It is Communist China and the Soviet Union that are real peace lovers. Japan's alliance with the US leads to the danger of Japanese involvement in a war caused by the US.

b. National Security

In the nuclear age, to state that one cannot defend one's country emptyhanded will eventually lead to a view admitting independent nuclear armament. Therefore, a peace securing system not relying on military power is the nation's security in the true sense of the world. The U.S./Japan Security Treaty should be immediately abrogated and the Self Defense Forces, which are unconstitutional anyway, will be liquidated (liquidated meaning its personnel will be transferred to peaceful duties). Japan will pursue a course of international unarmed neutrality.

3. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

a. World Situation

The international situation in Asia is intensifying in tension due to the activities of competing camps seeking rival methods of establishing a world order in the region. It is a war upon which the two sides are staking the victory of their respective global policies.

b. National Security

The major point of Japan's security lies in how to maintain Japan's peace and safety amidst such circumstances as outlined above. For this purpose, two major steps will be followed. First is the establishment of a "Self-Reliant" defense system achieved by halting the further expansion of the Self Defense Forces, and reorganize them in the direction of qualitative improvement of their functions. The US/Japan Security Treaty will be drastically reduced in scope, and the US forces withdrawn from Japanese territories. The US forces will be asked to return to Japan under a "stationing in emergency" policy if required.

4. Komeito (CGP=Clean Government Party)

a. World Situation

The struggle for power among the United States, Soviet Union, and Communist China is heightening the feeling of tension in the international situation and Japan's attitude

towards the US/Japan Treaty threatens to greatly influence the peace of Japan.

b. National Security

The Komeito sticks to absolute pacifism, advocating world racialism by which all the races of the world are unified as one race, and peace and prosperity of a nation are achieved without a sacrifice of any other nation. We firmly insist that any international dispute will be solved by a peaceful diplomatic means, never by military force. For this purpose, therefore, we will endeavor to materialize a total disarmament and a total abolition of nuclear arms, strengthen the peace making functions of the U.N., maintain the peace of the world by a permanent U.N. police force, and establish a new world of absolute peace and without armament. We will march towards world peace by enhancing the spirit of the pacifist and democratic Constitution throughout the world.

5. Japan Communist Party (JCP)

a. World Situation

The JCP concludes that the socialist states are peaceful forces and there is no danger of either Communist China or the Soviet Union attacking Japan. However, Japan is in danger of being invaded by the US and other imperialistic forces.

b. National Security

The JCP does not deny the right of self defense. It rejects "unarmed neutrality" because an appropriate self defense step is needed after the existing US/Japan security system has been destroyed. The unconstitutional SDF serves the US and oppresses the nation against the Constitution. Therefore, it must be eliminated and a people's army created.

Overall, the various party platforms clearly show that during this period, as long as Japan's external security was assured by Pax Americana, the Japanese people found little need to build and maintain a strong military force on its own. [Ref. 4] Combined with this was the widespread pacifist sentiment which resulted from the WWII experience. [Ref. 5] A further complication was caused by misgivings that should the US embark on a program of "dangerous adventurism" in Asia, Japan would be drawn into the conflict through the presence of US bases on her soil. [Ref. 6] The US/Japan Security Treaty would act as a "magnet." [Ref. 7] Therefore, for many Japanese, the utopian approaches outlined above had a strong emotional appeal, and in such issues, emotions were stronger than reason. [Ref. 8] However, an emotional over-reaction to some shocking future event might change the direction that Japan would take. [Ref. 9]

This was not long in coming.

B. PHASE II: DETENTE AND US WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA

The second phase begins with the Nixon shock over China and was rapidly accelerated by the 1973 OPEC oil embargo. These two events made it absolutely clear to Japan that she could no longer rely wholeheartedly upon the US. The Nixon shock pointed out that Japan really might be a inconsequential junior partner in US eyes. The oil embargo brought home two items. First, for all of the US military might, the oil embargo still hit home. Second, the oil embargo made the Japanese realize that for all of their industrial strength and development, the country was extremely vulnerable. Perhaps a better term would be resource dependent.

Also in 1975, the once unthinkable happened. The US withdrew from Vietnam. No longer omnipotent, no longer dauntless, the US was seen to be in decline. Even by the most optimistic eyes, the US commitment to Asia seemed to be waning. How much longer would Japan be seen as valuable enough to protect? Was it valuable enough to protect? These factors combined to bring about a turning point in the debate. The focal point became: the best military posture for Japan to assume. What should her defense policy actually be?

A look at period literature reveals the following synopsis. In the 60's, a younger and more pragmatic generation of scholars who had studied in the US published articles expressing approval of the security treaty and emphasizing the necessity of the SDF. These were still in

minority, however, with the majority of "idealists" urging "unarmed neutrality." [Ref. 10] The 70's were characterized by a decrease in unarmed neutrality articles and an increase in articles stressing necessity of national defense. No clear cut consensus emerged, however. [Ref. 11] The pacifist-radical coalition that has supported the equation "rearmament equals militarism" was disintegrating. [Ref. 12] Especially damaging to the opposition parties advocating unarmed neutrality (primarily the JSP) was a statement made to Japanese envoys by Chairman Mao. Regarding the JSP:

They don't defend their own country. Only a mentally deranged person would advocate unarmed neutrality and the like. What a strange political party. [Ref. 13]

By this time the DSP had almost completely ridden itself of utopian pacifism. [Ref. 14] Pacifists were also criticized:

...in short, his comment would lead to the conclusion that, because the Soviet Union is so powerful as to possess nuclear subs, the Japanese had better hold up their hands from the beginning, regardless of whether the Soviet fleet dominates the Sea of Japan and haunts waters adjacent to Japan. [Ref. 15]

MP Nakasone was especially critical of pacifists. Citing an example where a judge ruled the Self Defense Forces as unconstitutional and that citizens should defend themselves with strikes or mass uprisings, he accused the judge of exhorting people to go against machine guns with sticks. He even pointed out that this advice is much worse than the WWII

plan for Japanese citizens to attack allied forces with bamboo spears. [Ref. 16]

By now, it was clear that the dream of turning Japan into the "Switzerland of the Orient" was utopian to a fault in that it completely ignored the fact that Switzerland had been maintaining its neutrality with heavy arms.

[Ref. 17] The Japanese people learned perhaps their bitterest lesson from the oil crisis that rocked the whole world in 1973. [Ref. 18] This awakened them to the plain logic that the concept of selfish isolationism is incompatible with the cause of national survival. The decline in the popularity of the Socialist slogan of "unarmed neutrality" in the 70's is an eloquent indication that the popular movement based on utopian pacifism was on the ebb. [Ref. 19] By now it was seen as only natural that "we defend our own country ourselves." [Ref. 20] Japan's proper course was seen as that of a nation that possesses no nuclear arms but focuses heavily on self defense. [Ref. 21]

The next item to consider is Japan's world context. To some Japanese opinion leaders, the world surrounding Japan could be characterized by Pax Russo-Americana. "It is an undeniable fact that both powers wish at all costs to hold on to the booty they captured at such enormous sacrifice during WWII." [Ref. 22] This was complemented by the fact that the current era was an age of discontinuity;

characterized by major traumatic events such as the victory of a small state (Vietnam) over a giant power (US), and the 1973 oil crisis. [Ref. 23] The more the possibility of direct intervention by the superpowers decreases, the harder it is for them to restrain conflicts between or from smaller powers. [Ref. 24] For some, the reason the US failed in Vietnam was because it viewed the war simply in military and technological contexts, and gave little thought to other multiple factors hidden in the background. [Ref. 25] Thus, some now came to believe that it would be wrong to view the problem of national security for the 1970's simply in the context of military power. [Ref. 26]

The 1973 oil strategy by Arab states brought home to Japan the fragility of the foundation of national life. A mere 25% curtailment was enough to induce cries throughout Japan and bring on indescribable panic. [Ref. 27]

Another factor was Japan's standing in US eyes. The debate over US/Japan security system completely changed in nature as a result of President Nixon's 1972 China visit and normalization of relations between Japan and China in September of that year. Chinese Premier Zhou criticized "unarmed neutrality" and tended to support a limited rearmament. The change in defense doctrine is also attributable to Vietnam and President Carter's proposal to withdraw US ground troops from Korea. [Ref. 28]

Within this uncertain environment, Japan's position as an industrial country of the processing-trading type, heavily resource and energy intensive, now became a weakness. [Ref. 29] Japan was completely under the US "food" and "oil", in addition to nuclear, umbrellas. [Ref. 30]

The next concept dealt with is actual defense policy for Japan. Many interpret that Japan's acquisition of minimum defense capability does not violate Article 9. [Ref. 31] Japan Defense Agency Director General Nakasone launched a study aimed at self reliance in defense, shifting from the former 1957 defense policy to a new one of "self reliant defense with the US/Japan security system playing a supplementary role." [Ref. 32]

One scholar argued that the highest priority of Japan's defense policy ought to be placed on the formation of a national consensus on defense. [Ref. 33] By 1977, Japan's response to aggression consisted of (1) depending on the US for nuclear deterrence, (2) securing US cooperation against large scale conventional aggression, and (3) coping with small scale aggression on its own. The question is whether this response constituted adequate deterrence. [Ref. 34]

Another stated that it was necessary for Japan, in pondering its future security, to give priority consideration to the economic aspects of the problem, including energy and

food, as well as military problems. [Ref. 35] This was comprehensive security. However, taking comprehensive security measures does not justify putting too low a value on defense capability or keeping defense capability to a minimum. [Ref. 36]

In terms of this viewpoint, for Japan to be able to continue its existence as a free country, it must, as the first condition, protect its liberty and sovereignty as a state. [Ref. 37] Japan needed strong leadership and needed to create a balance between political will and defense capability. [Ref. 38] The defense might be present, but political will was still a carry over from post war days. Without a proper balance between will and means, defense capability could not serve the end of deterrence. [Ref. 39]

JDA Director Nakasone's policy took some missions over from the US, for example the high seas interception of enemies. This was seen by some as a step in the "right" direction. [Ref. 40]

Kaoru Murakami, a noted military commentator, stated that in his opinion, maintenance of defense capability on an appropriate level - neither excessive nor deficient - would be Japan's trump card. [Ref. 41] He believed that Japan ought to "do its best" at once to ensure regional security first. And to this end, Japan must push the following diplomatic strategy:

- Continue to maintain the US/Japan pact
- Strictly maintain a neutral stance regarding both the PRC and the USSR
- Exert immediate efforts to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula

Of these, most important to Japan is the Korean peninsula. [Ref. 42]

The US/Japan security treaty was vital to Japan's security. Had it not been for the security pact, it is doubtful whether the Japanese could have maintained the "Peace Constitution" without modification; and a ceiling on national defense expenditures pegged at less than one percent of the GNP would not have been a topic of debate. [Ref. 43] However, it was an "undeniable fact" that the security pact had destroyed the Japanese people's spirit of independence and resistance, the most vital requirement of national defense, by sheltering them with the American military presence. [Ref. 44]

Finally, a conflict on the Korean peninsula was seen as a grave danger. In order to prevent such a situation from arising, it was seen as imperative to keep the military strengths of both North and South Korea well balanced, and to this end, the best thing to do would be to ask the US to continue maintaining troops in South Korea. [Ref. 45]

Yet another issue, directly connected to the Korean problem, was how to cooperate with the PKO of the UN. [Ref. 46]

Relations with the United States were directly responsible for the relative stability of the Korean peninsula, and therefore to Japanese security. Only US military might under the security treaty can serve as an effective deterrent to war. [Ref. 47] The US, however, can never hope to fulfill its responsibility in keeping armed forces stationed in ROK without the cooperation of Japan, which functions as an important rear supply and logistics base. [Ref. 48]

Although the US/Japan treaty may primarily be one of the main pillars of the US strategy in the Far East, it also serves the interests of Japan, possibly even better than those of the US. [Ref. 49] The treaty is of immense importance to Japan militarily as well. Basically speaking, Japan's defense capability is not aimed at delivering any fatal blows to the enemy. [Ref. 50] The treaty is critical in offsetting this deficiency. Having a treaty also implies responsibility along with any benefits. Japan must adhere to the Japan-US security pact in order to fulfill her responsibility as a co-partner in mutual security within the framework of the Constitution. [Ref. 51]

Why is the treaty so beneficial to Japan? For one, the treaty kept the Soviet Union from using military power to "Finlandize" Japan. It also served to deter Japanese

involvement in the Sino-Soviet confrontation, which it could not have afforded to do. [Ref. 52] T h e S e l f Defense Forces (SDF) were also a critical part of Japan's defense policy. During this era, the majority of the Japanese public recognized the need for the existence of the Self Defense Forces. [Ref. 53] However, the SDF, at this time, had major defects. Tomohisa Sakanaka, editorial committee member of the Asahi Shimbun, wrote several articles which severely criticized the composition of the SDF. His primary arguments are as follows. Japan must have the capability to discourage an enemy from invading Japan or obstructing her interests. [Ref. 54] The SDF did not have the required capabilities. First, the SDF, while supposedly stressing instant reaction capability, actually did not possess that capability. Personnel shortages, combined with extremely limited ammunition stockpiles, made this a farce. Second, the relative lack of reserves meant that replenishment for combat troops was limited. Finally, there was no coordination between the three service branches. This left tremendous gaps in defense which could be easily exploited by an invading enemy. In his own words, "One can conclude that the SDF are actually a form of collateral to secure American commitment under the security treaty." [Ref. 55]

He was not the only critic. Even a scholar in the arts was sufficiently concerned to write an essay submitted to Chuo

Koron, the principle magazine of scholarly debate in Japan. In it, Tsuneari Fukuda states that it would not be easy for Japan to hold out against an attack for even two weeks, much less two or three months, as "current doctrine" required. [Ref. 56] Perhaps it is only natural that from the standpoint of the unity and consistency of the defense set up, the complementarity of the US and Japanese forces became very important. [Ref. 57]

Kaoru Murakami had the following solutions to correct the deficiencies of both Japanese defense policy and the SDF. First, the formation of Japanese alliances with Pacific basin countries was "absolutely essential" in order to strengthen Japan's say in the international arena. [Ref. 58] Second, Japan must follow a more responsible economic policy, instead of just merely maximizing profits or cutting costs for Japan. This was to maintain, if not increase, the number of "friends" Japan had in the international arena. Third, the National Defense Council must be strengthened. He points out that basic understanding of the defense issue is absent at all levels of the Japanese people, from Diet members to high school students. There were too many restrictions governing and limiting the activities of the SDF, which also severely curtailed realistic training. He attributes this state of affairs to the Defense Council, an advisory organ to the Prime Minister, being unable to discuss defense policy. Rather, it concentrated on such "nuts and bolts" affairs best handled

directly by the Defense Agency. Third, the SDF concentrated on upgrading capabilities by buying up the newest and most expensive weapons systems, ignoring the necessities of a high-low mix which would permit a greater stockpiling of munitions. Fourth, Japan lacked a suitable surveillance system, as evidenced by the relative ease with which a defecting Soviet pilot was able to land at Hakodate Airport. Fifth, Japan needed a stockpile of oil and food, at least six months worth. Finally, standardized weaponry was needed. [Ref. 59]

From the preceding paragraphs, it becomes clear that events had indeed changed the course of Japanese security policy and thought. No longer encapsulated in an ideal world ensured by Pax- Americana, Japan discovered that she needed a realistic defense policy. At the same time, the US could not be relied upon completely. Therefore, it was evident that Japan had to take some step on her own.

C. PHASE III: COLD WAR REVISITED

This brings the study to the third period. A look at Japan's world reveals the following. 1978 heralded the start of a major increase in Soviet Pacific Fleet surface combatants, with the first addition of a major surface combatant, a cruiser, in many years. This was a major shift from the former, submarine centered force strategy. A task group centered around a Kiev class carrier was added to the Pacific fleet in 1979. Within the next two years, two more

cruisers and another carrier task force were added. This increased the surface strength of the fleet by about 150%. [Ref. 60] The increase in numbers was augmented by more significant qualitative improvements represented by the new ships.

This shift in fleet concentration and the rapid growth suggested a major shift in Soviet naval policy, away from a relatively defensive policy aimed at basic survival. The Pacific Fleet was no longer oriented solely around submarines, but now developed a capacity for establishing naval presence and projection of power beyond coastal waters. Especially alarming was a substantial increase in purely offensive forces, namely the increase of amphibious landing capacity from three LST's to ten LST's and one LPD.

This buildup continued throughout the early 1980's and was readily apparent to the Japanese. Period literature focuses upon this buildup, as evidenced by the synopsis presented below.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet seems to be in a transition period, undergoing a change from a coastal defense force to an offensive ocean fleet in view of the configuration of its bases being built in the Far East. The Russians will continue their efforts to place the Sea of Japan under their control as long as Vladivostok continues to be the homeport of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. A well known fact is that the Russians have long made strenuous efforts to acquire exits to warm waters.

During the OKEAN 75 exercise, it was clearly evident that the mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was to destroy air bases on the US West coast, deal a blow to US naval power in the Pacific, and neutralize Japan. The disposition of ships in the exercise was designed to attack ships carrying food and petroleum to Japan and sink USN vessels protecting the sea lanes. As long as Japan depends on marine transportation of petroleum, food, and natural resources, the Russians will have life and death power over the Japanese by securing command of the seas around Japan. [Ref. 61]

Accordingly, the SDF branches that need greater strength are the maritime and air forces. Unless the Soviet Pacific Fleet reinforcement is matched by Japanese capability, SDF's deterrent effect will diminish. Once the American prop is gone, Japan's freedom on the high seas will be severely curtailed. [Ref. 62]

Murakami pointed out the dangers to Japan should North Korea somehow forcibly unify the Korean Peninsula, and threw the doors open to the Soviets. According to him, if the Soviet fleet frequented Pusan, it could turn the Sea of Japan into a Soviet lake, and also secure a crucial gateway to the Pacific Ocean. Should Pusan be captured, hostile jets could reach Kyushu in five minutes. [Ref. 63]

Soviet buildup of ground forces on Kunashiri and Etorofu also contributed to the feeling of alarm. Soviet military activity also increased. In 1981, 360 Soviet naval vessels

passed through the Sea of Japan. In 1982, the JASDF had to scramble 929 times to counter territorial violations by Soviet military aircraft. The Soviet Union also demonstrated a relative lack of concern for the sovereignty of smaller nations in adjacent areas, as exemplified by the 1984 downing of KAL 007. Combined with the previous track record set by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, these events focused the attention of the Japanese public to the military buildup and increased a feeling of insecurity in the face of it.

By 1984, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had become the largest of the four Russian fleets. Size was not the only significant element. Whereas the Pacific Fleet used to consist of second rate units with inferior equipment, it had by then become the recipient of the latest ships and equipment.

More important than the fleet itself are the perceived underlying motives. The dramatic rise in Soviet naval forces can be linked to the opportunity to fill the power vacuum, as mentioned in a previous section, left by the decline of US naval strength in the area, and to establish a dominant Soviet influence in the area. As Soviet economic influence on Japan was "minimal," the Soviet buildup, combined with use of bases in Vietnam, gave the Soviet Union the potential to exert leverage along the sea lanes vital to the Japanese economy. By establishing a credible sea denial capability, the Soviet Union created a potent weapon which is of overpowering strength if a target nation's economy has a heavy reliance

upon maritime commerce. Without a countering force, Soviet naval presence, with its threat towards sea lanes, could force a maritime nation to accept Soviet demands in order to preserve their economies. Japan had just undergone a soul searching realization into just how vulnerable her economy really was, and then was faced with this buildup.

Perhaps the best summarization of the above is expressed in the Japan Defense Agency's White Paper. Below are the findings:

1. Soviet naval and air forces now possess a potentially formidable threat to sea transport routes connecting Japan with the United States and with its sources of oil and other natural resources in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Australia.
2. Soviet access to bases in Vietnam has provided the Soviet Pacific Fleet with a greater operational range in the Indian Ocean and near the Southeast Asian Straits connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
3. Air force modernization and the construction of new airfields in eastern Siberia and Sakhalin give the USSR impressive air attack capabilities against the Japanese home islands.
4. Soviet military support of client governments in Vietnam, Angola, and Ethiopia demonstrated a growing ability and willingness to intervene militarily in the Third World.
5. Amphibious landing capabilities have emerged in the Soviet Pacific Fleet and may represent the beginning of a long term effort to develop a greater capability.
6. The expansion of Moscow's political influence in East Asia is a key motive behind the Soviet military buildup. The assertion of military power gives the USSR greater leverage in dealing with client states like Vietnam. It forces noncommunist states in the region to take the Soviets into greater account in their formulation of foreign policy.

How did this buildup affect Japanese vulnerability? Of special concern is that the USSR concentrated its growth upon maritime and air forces rather than ground forces. The USSR has "always" had an impressive array of ground forces in the area, but these forces were mostly directed at the PRC. Naval and air forces are aimed towards another objective, one which boded ill for Japan. The key lies in Japan's geographic position.

Japan lies between the USSR and the open ocean. Hence, it has a potential capability to bottle up Soviet forces in the Sea of Japan. [Ref. 64] Consequently, the Soviets saw Japan as a potential hazard.

The blocking off works in both directions. The hostile nature of the interior territories, combined with the inability of the Trans-Siberian railway to support the amount of commerce required, makes the Soviet sea lines of communication vital to Soviet growth in the Far East. Japan provides a significant barrier to this traffic which travels via the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific because all of this traffic must pass through one of the three straits: Soya; Tsugaru; or Tsushima. Therefore, solely through virtue of its location, Japan carries the dual menace of blocking supplies to the area, and keeping the Soviet fleet bottled up in the Japan Sea. For these reasons, the Soviet Union had a heavy interest in Japan's military capability, and its own capability to ensure that Japan will not dare take such

actions as outlined above. The best way to accomplish this is to develop sufficient sea denial capability in the area and hold Japan's economy hostage to ensure Japanese inaction.

For the Japanese, Japan's geographic situation also raised concern for defense planners, especially in the light of Soviet power composition. Japan is a densely populated island nation located close to the Asian continent. Therefore, it has the following vulnerabilities. Japan's proximity to the mainland makes it vulnerable to air attack from mainland Asia. This is compounded by her extreme demographic density and concentration. Because of its mountainous formation, her population and industrial centers are concentrated along very narrow coastal zones. This extremely congested nation is sustained by an increasingly complex system of transportation and communication networks. The whole nation can be likened to a mammoth exposed precision mechanism interconnected by sensitive joints and delicate links. To top it off, Japan's narrow island formation gives it very short depth in defense. Relatively modest air attacks could easily destroy Japan's vital industrial centers. [Ref. 65] On the other hand, if Japan could somehow cope with airborne threats, the span of her territories would provide an unlimited depth in defense if Japan could control the ocean that extends at its south side, thereby providing immense SLOC defense.

The SLOCs are also vital to Japan's survival. Japan imports most of its raw materials, the most important of which

is oil, and imports a very high percentage of her consumed resources. Thus, Japan's SLOCs are a virtual lifeline for Japan and the collapse of Japan could be brought about by their sustained disruption.

For the above reasons, the long range goal of Japan's defense planners would seem to be making Japan strong enough to defend its skies and territorial waters, and at the same time protect its SLOCs. To do so by herself would be prohibitively expensive.

In such an environment, perhaps it is only natural that Japanese security debate focused upon how to complement the US military power. Japan alone cannot stand up against the might of the Soviet Union. Even the capability to defend the vitally important SLOCs can be questioned, and further capability in this arena was encouraged.

It appeared that Japan could no longer totally depend upon the United States. Therefore, the solution would appear to be bolstering the US as much as possible. This is the theme underlying the debate during the first half of the 1980's. Policies set by two consecutive Prime Ministers underscore this perception. In 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki agreed to Japan undertaking the defense of her SLOCs for 1000 nautical miles. In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone proposed making Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the US. More significant, for the purposes of this study, is the debate in

the scholarly journals. A synopsis of the debate is presented next.

In 1980, the Japanese government tried to shift from a "basic defense power" concept to a new defense concept designed to counter the Soviet threat. [Ref. 66] For the first time, Japan expressed solidarity with the US by denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [Ref. 67] Up to now, Japan had delayed paying its burdensharing costs as long as possible and devoted itself to creating a future world order during this indeterminate grace period. [Ref. 68]

According to Nagai Yonosuke, professor at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, the name of the game in politics today is not power but influence. To him, arms are nothing but a means of bargaining power. [Ref. 69]

During this period, various defense plans were being unveiled, officially and not, and in all was the supposition of the Soviet Union as the most serious threat, other than another oil crisis. [Ref. 70] It is virtually impossible for Japan's 118 million people to survive on nothing more than their own efforts and the nation's own land and resources. [Ref. 71] Nagai stated that the cardinal point in counter-Soviet defense is to not allow the Soviet Union to harbor any intention of invading Japan. His concept would have two elements: enable the Soviet Union to make full use of Japan's economic and technological strength

through mutually beneficial relationships in trade relations, and economic and technological cooperation; and (more significant for the purposes of this study) by making the cost of invading Japan too high. In his opinion, Japan must not be defeated. It must possess the capability to resist invasion for at least three months. She needs capability to repel and endure an attack. At the same time, Japan must not launch a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union (to avoid provocation), and adhere to a "strictly defensive" posture. Japan's advantage lies in being defensive. Moral advantage, combined with technological advances in weaponry, would offset the weakness of the defending Japanese side. Nagai does not like pacifists, either. He states that those who say that Japan might as well give up defense of sea lanes is too expensive are looking at the unsuitable (for Japan) examples of Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan.

Nagai's policy for the future was as follows:

Japan's concept of defense in the narrow sense must focus on an exclusively defensive stance based on the theory of asymmetric conflict:

- merge all 3 services
- improved C3
- strengthen Japanese denial power (against invasion)
- achieve technological prowess in high technology
- join the UN peacekeeping operations

- establish a "moral equivalent" to conscription. [Ref. 72]

Masatake Okumiya, ASDF Lieutenant General and noted historian, wrote an article emphasizing the need for Japan to protect her SLOCs. [Ref. 73] In it he stated that if, through future efforts, Japan is able to strengthen its ability to protect the sea lanes in its vicinity, then there is every hope that this will leave more of the US forces free for assignment to the protection of sea lanes farther away. Thanks to the combined strength of Japan's SDF and the US/Japan treaty, the security of the sea lanes around Japan have been maintained without the Japanese peoples' awareness. It is high time the people recognized that Japan should possess a defense capability appropriate to its national strength. It cannot be repeated too often that the security of the country's sea lanes is vital even in peacetime. Those who remember or are acquainted with Japan's World War II experience under the US blockade, and believe that history proves just how difficult it is to provide maritime protection may have a point when they put forward the argument that defending sea lanes is unnecessary or even impossible. However, it is not appropriate simply to use these facts alone as a basis for arguing about the present and the future. After all, Britain succeeded, albeit at great cost, in keeping open its shipping lanes in the Atlantic during both World Wars with the cooperation of the US and other countries. The

s e c u r i t y o f t h e S L O C s m u s t b e
maintained. [Ref. 74] In the opinion of another
scholar, the Japanese have forgotten that as a trading nation,
Japan benefitted more than any other country, from free trade
principles. [Ref. 75]

Strengthening the international security system calls for
closer consultation between Washington and its
allies. [Ref. 76] This does not mean Japan blindly
following a US lead, however. If Japan intends to increase
defense capabilities under such an alliance, it should do so
more as a reinforcement of its autonomy rather than
strengthening its posture of "plunging" toward the
US. [Ref. 77] The 1983 "unsinkable carrier"
statement provoked an angry Soviet response. In order to avoid
this vicious circle in the future, Japan must prepare
independent initiatives in foreign affairs, not relying
excessively on US military might for national
security. [Ref. 78]

Nagai states that national security is the state of
affairs in which the crisis that would necessitate the
sacrifice of a country's core values is
avoided. [Ref. 79] The maintenance of a collective
security system, with the US/Japan security treaty at the
core, and a friendly relationship with the Western countries
are of paramount importance in Japan's defense against the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 80] Kuriyama Takakazu, an

official at the treaties bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, feels that it is necessary for the industrial democracies of the West to submerge minor differences for the sake of greater common interests. [Ref. 81] Recognizing that the further expansion of Soviet Union in Southwest Asia and the Middle East is a major threat, Japan and other Western countries need to work out countermeasures while adjusting policies under US leadership. Japan's policy should have the following elements 1) aid to promote stability; 2) steps to promote Soviet self restraint; 3) deployment of necessary military strength. [Ref. 82]

Up to now, by espousing such ideas as unarmed neutrality, a 1% GNP cap on military spending, and singleminded concentration on economic development, Japan's foreign policy has lacked international common sense. It is a mature Japan's international responsibility to stop behaving in defiance of international common sense. [Ref. 83] Japan needs support in international opinion. Therefore, it must make diplomatic efforts to avoid being isolated. [Ref. 84] Japan is already viewed internationally as a nation with special characteristics, and if its foreign affairs officials were to continue stressing these, Japan would have no alternative but to tread a path leading to diplomatic isolation. [Ref. 85]

Kuriyama further states that in order for Japan to fulfill its responsibilities within a cooperative system among

industrial democracies, with close US/Japan relations as cornerstone of foreign policy, is to choose the path of an active peace-oriented foreign policy that is now called for. [Ref. 86] However, as Sase Masamori, a professor at the National Defense Academy, points out, the idea that the military element can be removed from a relationship between nations referred to as an alliance goes against international common sense. [Ref. 87]

Sase goes on to say that it is a fact that where national security is concerned, there are certain situations in which only military measures are of any use. Japanese leaders have been reluctant to accept this relatively simple fact. [Ref. 88] Kuriyama feels that the only option open for Japan is for Japan and Europe alike to build a system of cooperation among the industrial democracies while maintaining solidarity with the US through a more balanced sharing of international responsibilities. [Ref. 89]

Kaoru Murakami favors an arms buildup. According to him, a nation's security depends on a combination of diplomacy, economic cooperation, economic policy, and defense, with defense being the last resort. [Ref. 90]

Some would even advocate doing away with the three nonnuclear principles in the interest of national security. "The idea that Japan wants national security and its 3 nonnuclear principles, especially the non introduction clause as applying to the US Navy, will never be understood by the

outside world because it violates international common sense." [Ref. 91]

Another author, Kunihiro Masao, believes that Japan should adapt to its present environment by using its economic and technological might in the development of what he calls "the moral equivalent of military power". If Japan fails to do so, the Japanese perception of Japan as a superpower, prompting pretensions to being a political and military power, could isolate Japan in the international arena. That is why the Japanese cannot afford to delay. [Ref. 92] In short, Japan should use its economic power and advanced technology unstintingly in an effort to realize the goal of peace, in accordance with its Constitution. [Ref. 93] The Japanese must clearly recognize the place of military strength in the context of comprehensive security. [Ref. 94] Finally, the very conclusion of the US/Japan treaty can be seen as signifying recognition of the right of collective self defense. [Ref. 95]

Regarding the military aspect of comprehensive security, the consolidation of Japan's own defense capability takes on a new meaning. This is Japan's responsibility under the US/Japan security treaty.

As US responsibility for the rest of the world increases, Japan's assumption of the minimum necessary responsibility of its own defense has become necessary for the peace of the

world as a whole. It is essential that Japan realize the importance of strengthening its defense capability from this viewpoint as well.

In conclusion, according to Kuriyama, Japan has always borne its share of responsibility in encouraging the growth of a free and open economic system. Since the US can no longer be expected to bear the entire burden of preserving world peace and defending Japan's security, the separation of political and economic considerations will no longer pass muster internationally. Peace and security under a democratic system can only be protected by combining forces with the US and other industrial democracies with similar goals. There is no need to blindly follow the US. However, security is expensive. The best way to minimize costs is to share the responsibility of security with other Western countries. [Ref. 96]

Japan must realize that the US' distorted "free ride" perception will be curbed only when Japan abandons its self indulgent attitude and demonstrates its willingness to fulfill its responsibilities as an ally. [Ref. 97] Japan must consider ways to respond to US expectations in order to maintain friendly relations between the two nations. [Ref. 98]

During this timeframe, articles in the monthly magazines tended to approve strengthening US/Japan relations. [Ref. 99]

Even Sekai, which once carried many articles advocating unarmed neutrality, now printed only a few essays calling for the abolition of the SDF and US/Japan security treaty. [Ref. 100] The Japanese people came to accept the security treaty. [Ref. 101] A period survey showed, insofar as it is reliable, that the majority of Japanese favored defense through the SDF and US/Japan security treaty while opposing Constitutional revision. [Ref. 102]

One scholar bemoaned the fact many people in Japan tended to wishfully interpret the US/Japan security treaty in a way favorable to Japan. [Ref. 103] They appeared to believe that although the US is demanding that Japan increase its defense capability, even if Japan refused to do so, the US will take up the slack, albeit reluctantly. To support their assertion, they point to the vast sums the US has invested in Japan. He does not think this generosity would last forever. [Ref. 104]

Prime Minister Suzuki, in an 1981 Japan-US joint communique, stated that:

Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance with its Constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding sea and air space, and for further alleviating the financial burden of US forces in Japan. [Ref. 105]

Many scholars agreed with this statement, and advocated a reinterpretation of the security treaty in order to facilitate

the aims stated therein. It is only natural that there should be changes in the way the treaty is implemented after it had been in force for over 20 years. The US/Japan security treaty is just one of many treaties. As has been demonstrated countless times in the past, a treaty maintains its effectiveness so long as there is a rough parity of interests between the two parties concerned. [Ref. 106] Japan was running the risk of alienating its treaty partner. This situation must be rectified.

The world had changed for the US, too. The US, based on Pax Americana, was apt to consider leadership as unilaterally defining what is best for the world and expecting other countries to follow suit. Kuriyama argued that Japan and other Western countries must point out to the US the difference between unilateral action and leadership. [Ref. 107]

This returns to the point of ensuring an independent foreign policy for Japan. As mentioned earlier, in 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone visited the US and emphasized the importance of close US-Japan ties. The most controversial point during his US visit was the fact that he set forth a policy of reinforcing the US/Japan military alliance. According to Tokyo University professor Igarashi Takeshi, the Japanese must keep a careful watch to see whether this policy is compatible with Japan's peaceful national ideals. If Nakasone really intends to make Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", the Japanese may have to say farewell to

the peace loving state. The most disappointing aspect of Nakasone's trip to the US is that he made no effort to put across Japan's peace loving ideals. The US public may see Nakasone's statements as meaning Japan is no longer serious about realizing the ideals of a peace loving nation, and therefore increase demands for a buildup of Japan's defense capability on the grounds of the US/Japan military alliance. [Ref. 108]

One possible source of Japan's bargaining power may lie in the apparent inconsistency of being a lightly armed, nonnuclear economic power. The awareness of other countries of the possibility of Japanese rearmament might serve as a bargaining point because it deters other countries from exerting pressure on Japan to rearm heavily. [Ref. 109]

To summarize this phase, it can be said that because Japan discovered that the threat facing her was so overwhelming, the only hope for Japan's survival lay in bolstering as much as possible the US. There was simply no way Japan could cope on her own. The zenith of this trend of thought is perhaps represented by Yatsuhiro Nakagawa. He believed that the best thing Japan could do was to encourage the formation of a Western Pacific Treaty Organization (WEPTO), based upon and ancillary to, NATO. The interim solution would be to form an US/Japan/ROK alliance until such a major step could be taken. In short, for this school, the best solution for Japan to

pursue was to adapt immediately the Western system of collective security. [Ref. 110]

This concept permeated the debate of the period. However, a underlying condition was that Japan should do so of her own volition, not because the US desired her to.

This brings the study the next chapter, which focuses upon Phase IV, New World Order and the current security policy debate in Japan.

III PHASE IV: NEW WORLD ORDER AND CURRENT SECURITY POLICY DEBATE

Two events in 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, have served to intensify the ongoing security policy debate among Japanese opinion leaders. Another factor is the perceived decline of the United States. Given that the U.S - Japan relationship is a key part of Japan's security policy, many are stating that this bilateral relationship needs to be altered. Especially significant is the debate surrounding the U.S. Japan security relationship. The purpose of this chapter is to look at an emerging school of thought, the Internationalist school, regarding Japan's new security role and her relations with the United States.

The chapter is organized in the following manner. First, two other schools of thought, the Status Quo and Neo Nationalist schools, will be briefly defined and discussed. Second, the Internationalist school will be presented, along with its views on the dangers of continuing current policies and its proposal for a new security role for Japan. Finally, internationalist thoughts on revising the U.S. Japan Mutual Security Treaty will be discussed.

It is important to realize that the Internationalist school is on the political right in Japan. The three schools presented here represent a relatively recent, pronounced

division in the political right. Alternative schools of thought have always been present on the left.

A. STATUS QUO

The reason the study identifies the first school as status quo is that these intellectuals see the maintenance of Japan's reliance upon the U.S. for security as the best option for Japan to pursue, thereby maintaining the current status quo between the U.S. and Japan. This extension of the Yoshida doctrine is the majority view, not only in Japanese government, but also among the public. [Ref. 111]

Opinions characteristic of this school are: any security moves on Japan's part will be the bare minimum necessary to keep the U.S. engaged, and to deflect "gaiatsu", or foreign pressure; and continued reliance upon the principles of comprehensive security, less flatteringly referred to as neo-mercantilism. Comprehensive security, or sogo anzen hosho, is "that policy which puts greater emphasis on economic and diplomatic means than on military means for pursuing the nations security." [Ref. 112] Any increases in Japan's security role will be limited to nonmilitary dimensions of its comprehensive security policy. [Ref. 113] Military dimensions of Japan's security policy will in all probability be limited to the territories of Japan and its 1000-mile defense perimeter. [Ref. 114] For the near term, the alliance between the United States and Japan, an

"insurance policy," [Ref. 115] is the best way to a global security system. [Ref. 116] Maintaining some US forces in Japan serves the interests of both nations, and proves a military and political link understood by both friend and foe. [Ref. 117] Regarding Japan's security role, its most important security task is to help the United States remain a Pacific power by increasing support for stationing US troops in Japan. [Ref. 118] As for its extraregional security role, Japan should provide personnel for UN peacekeeping operations and monetary contributions commensurate with its economic power. [Ref. 119] Perhaps the Japanese bureaucracy is the best advocate of this status quo viewpoint:

Japanese security policy is formulated and implemented largely by these three major ministries operating along two axes. On questions of economic security, MITI, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the core in which Japanese policy is articulated. On questions of military security the central bureaucratic organizations are the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Agency. While an informal inter ministerial coordination routinely takes place between both areas of security policy, distinctive institutional arrangements affecting issues of military security assure that political and economic perspectives retain paramount importance in national security policy making. [Ref. 120]

This brings the study to the next school of thought.

B. NEO NATIONALIST

The next alternative school is the Neo Nationalist school. This school maintains that Japan should pursue a "completely"

independent policy from the U.S. Summarized broadly, these opinion leaders want Japan to discard the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the war renouncing Constitution, and to build up an independent defense capability. They are immensely confident in the strength of Japan's technology and economy to keep the world at bay, hence the name Neo-Nationalist.

Most prominent among this group is MP Shintaro Ishihara. In his book, The Japan That Can Say No, he states that the current military posture of Japan is a direct result of U.S. desires, and not one which is suited for the defense of Japan:

By shaping Japan's armed forces according to a U.S. strategic plan, Washington was able to demonstrate its military might and that it would be a reliable ally. Japan's flawed security policy is the result of four decades of acquiescent diplomacy. Our leaders have gone along with Washington on everything. It would be less expensive to defend ourselves than to continue the present arrangement with the United States. We have subordinated our security interests to America's global strategy and pay much of the cost of maintaining their forces in Japan." [Ref. 121]

Regarding the security treaty, he has the following to say:

It is time a Japanese Prime Minister said "We will protect ourselves with our own strength and wisdom." This will entail certain sacrifices. Although not yet politically feasible, with a popular consensus, we could do it. We have the technological and fiscal resources for an independent, defensive military force. I am not suggesting we abrogate the security treaty immediately. That is not realistic. Our relationship with the United States is of fundamental importance and we owe much to the treaty. My point is that to rule out this possibility-not even to think about it-deprives us of an important bargaining chip. Today, the security treaty is no longer indispensable. We have sufficient resources to maintain the present level of defense capability on our own. Both the left and right in Japan become so emotional about the

security alliance that a reasoned national debate on the issue has been impossible. Like it or not, however, before long we will have to reassess the pact and make a decision. [Ref. 122]

What sort of military posture should Japan adopt, then? The answer to this lies in another article written by MP Ishihara regarding the FSX controversy. In it, he states:

But surely a cheaper and more effective defense, one that could prevent an enemy from landing, would deploy numerous high-speed, missile equipped vessels along the coast...A fundamental review of our defense philosophy is needed as quickly as possible. [Ref. 123]

MP Ishihara apparently sees the direct defense of the Japanese homeland as the only defense requirement Japan should possess. His viewpoint had been widely characterized as an extremist, minority one. However, given the rising anti-American sentiment in the Japanese public, this author feels that it is a viewpoint which may gain popularity in the future. Other writers have stated similar viewpoints. Takeaki Hori, an international affairs critic, describes the U.S. logic in extracting funding from Japan for the Gulf war as "scoundrel-like." [Ref. 124] He goes on to say that the U.S and Japan must recognize that the end of the Cold War has changed their respective international positions. [Ref. 125] He further likens Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama, and accuses the U.S. of hypocrisy by not taking any action towards Israel, which has continuously occupied land

illegally. Currently, the U.S. believes strongly in its concept of Pax Americana, and then forces Japan to take conforming actions. His conclusion is that the U.S. must treat Japan on equal terms, and Japan should be willing to tell the U.S. so. Takeshi Igarashi, a political science professor at the University of Tokyo, questions the alliance in terms of the validity of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan. Stating that the Japanese public sees the stationing of troops in Japan as an extension of the Occupation, thereby leading to deep public resentment, he states that in this era of relaxing international tension Japan must question why U.S. troops are permitted to remain. Furthermore, in order to maintain Japanese funding of U.S. troops stationed in Japan, the U.S. must agree to two conditions. First, the purpose of the troops and their operating guidelines must be made clear. Second, Japan's financial participation would be conditional on the observance of the first condition. The extension of his argument is that the U.S. can no longer rely on unqualified Japanese support for American military action. [Ref. 126]

C. INTERNATIONALIST

The third school is the Internationalist school. Probably the biggest distinction between the Internationalists and the aforementioned Status quo or Neo nationalists is that these two schools characterize Japan as unique or Eastern. The

internationalists see a need for a break with the past, and that the "Westernization" of Japan is necessary for Japan to become a member of the modern world. [Ref. 127] Although still a minority view, their viewpoint has become the center of media and scholarly debate. The primary characteristic of the Internationalist school is that they advocate a much greater security role for Japan, but always under the context of U.S. Japan relations. A review of translated articles yields the following synthesis.

1. Internationalist debate during the Gulf War

The Japanese have begun to realize their single minded pursuit of affluence and use of wealth to win friends and influence people are not working. The Gulf crisis, as far as Japan is concerned, was perceived as a diplomatic and public relations failure. The first indication of her weakness was the cancellation of Prime Minister Kaifu's trip to the Middle East upon Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. "This postponement on the eve of his departure reveals to the world with shameful clarity that Kaifu, as Japan's Prime Minister, has no clear vision of the post Cold-War world.", claimed a major Japanese newspaper. [Ref. 128] This was followed by months of debate in the Diet over issues such as constitutionality and finances, with the perception that PM Kaifu was being prodded along by the "Bush-phone." [Ref. 129] According to Kenichi Ito, political science professor at the

Aoyama Gakuin University, Japanese interest in the conflict waned as soon as its own, direct concern, the Japanese hostages, were released. After that, the Japanese joined the ranks of onlookers, happy to look at the conflict from the outside. [Ref. 130] Tokyo's policy makers knew that despite Japan's desire to "look good" overseas, it was deeply shamed by its response to the Gulf crisis. In the words of scholar/former Diet member Motoo Shiina, by following a course of being a deserter in the time of crisis, Japan was once again turning towards isolation. [Ref. 131]

What about the post Cold-War world? Is it not a safer place? According to the Internationalist scholars, it was not. There are several points which must be kept in mind when dealing with the new world. First, in spite of big visible changes in Europe, as far as the Asia Pacific region is concerned, there is no change in the severe military situation in general. [Ref. 132] Second, regional conflicts are more likely to appear, and their dangers have increased for several reasons. It is much easier for adventurous leaders to get modern weaponry and the increased interdependence of nations causes the impact of such conflicts to spread internationally. And finally, the major powers are currently facing widespread opinions of "disarmament", thereby perceived as having less resolve by other countries. [Ref. 133]

In addition to regional conflicts, the Soviet threat (this debate took place during the Gulf crisis, prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union) still exists for Japan. The increased warmth between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. leaves Japan out in the cold. The peace in Europe is more than offset by the redeployment of weaponry from Eastern Europe to east of the Ural mountains, and the Soviet Union is still upgrading its strategic nuclear weapons and upgrading its air force capabilities in the region around Japan. [Ref. 134] Overall, anxieties have increased not only for the above reasons, but new concerns regarding North Korean development of nuclear weaponry, instability on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. force reductions in ROK, Japan, and the Philippines, and the political instability /ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union.

To sum it up, the detente between the two superpowers did not signal the advent of a new era of peace. Taichi Sakaiya laments that the end of the cold war and restructuring of world order are issues Japanese neither understand nor are interested in. [Ref. 135] Motoo Shiina felt that the Gulf Crisis had reminded Japan of the harsh fact that the use of force and situations requiring its use will remain an inescapable fact of international relations. [Ref. 136] He goes on to say that the only peace dividend is peace itself, there is no economic gain. The world, Japan included, must create a framework

which will allow everyone to continue receiving peace. [Ref. 137]

The North/South and East/West conflicts still exist for Japan. According to Tokyo University professor Seizaburo Sato, Japan, as dependent as it is upon global peace and free trade, must take the initiative and assume its own burden in helping to create a new world order in order to maintain its prosperity and peace. [Ref. 138] In order to make the post Cold-War world a peaceful one, the major powers must cooperate closely and make it clear through their actions that they will not allow aggression. [Ref. 139] And, according to Kabun Muto, Japan is a major power. In fact, if balance of payments, debts and credits, and other factors are all considered along with GNP, Japan is the #1 power in the world. [Ref. 140] As such, it must bear responsibility to make contributions towards world order. [Ref. 141]

2. Required Actions

What should Japan have done? Iraq established a dangerous precedent which, if left unchecked, could undermine the international order. By responding to this, Japan could have found a real voice for itself in this and other global affairs. [Ref. 142] It also should have taken action as this would have demonstrated to the world that Japan supported the coalition. As a member of the UN, Japan has an obligation to participate when necessary in collective military action on order to stop aggression. [Ref. 143] According to former Prime Minister Nakasone, it should have showed willingness to share the pains of maintaining order and worked towards a resolution, without running away from its responsibilities. [Ref. 144] Specific steps to be taken included economic assistance to those countries adversely affected by the embargo; and a contribution to the multinational forces. [Ref. 145] Shiina backs this up by stating that the most effective step Japan could have taken would have been to send personnel. This would have shown that the Japanese people are willing to stand with its allies, sharing risk and hardship. [Ref. 146] One scholar, Masamichi Inoki, mentions that JMSDF ships should have been sent. As long as they transited international waters there would be no repercussions, and showing the

Japanese flag would have avoided embarrassment about the lack of Japanese response. [Ref. 147] Inoki's debate partner in the article, Shinichi Kitaoka, felt that although sending JMSDF ships may have been too drastic a step, there were several areas in which personnel and equipment could have been sent where their contribution would have been helpful, justified, and permitted by public and international opinion. These are: peace keeping operations (PKO), freedom of navigation, logistics transportation, medical, and construction. [Ref. 148] Kenichi Ito states that the very least Japan could have done was to provide some of this rear guard support. [Ref. 149] Former Ambassador to the US Nobuo Matsunaga asked who could realistically criticize the use of SDF ships and planes to transport refugees out of the area? [Ref. 150] Kitaoka states that transportation was the area where Japan could have helped out the most, but instead, Japan took a negative step by outlining unrealistic restrictions.

To Kenichi Ito, the Gulf Crisis was a good opportunity to show the SDF to the world, that is, a SDF that will not aggress against other countries, but will defend peace. At the very least, it would have demonstrated to the world that Japan contributed. Otherwise, states Seizaburo Sato, the impression would arise that Japan foists off all of its dirty work to someone else.

The next question to arise is whether or not it would have been possible to deploy the SDF. The first item is that of legality. Japan has two laws which strictly govern the use of the SDF. These are Article 9 of its Constitution, and the SDF Law. Article 9 states that Japan renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Although some, such as Jun Eto [Ref. 151] and MP Nakasone, [Ref. 152] state that the Constitution must be revised immediately, Inoki and Kitaoka feel that it is probably best to delay any revisions until the pre WWII "militarists" die off and the currently charged political atmosphere settles down. [Ref. 153]

In the meantime, the Constitution can be reinterpreted. In the views of Seizaburo Sato and Hisahiko Okazaki, Japan's Constitution and laws can be interpreted minimally or maximally. [Ref. 154] The minimalist concept says Japan cannot do anything that is not explicitly condoned by law. The maximalist concept is that Japan can do anything not specifically prohibited. Japanese politicians and bureaucrats tend to be maximalists when it comes to administrative guidance of business, but minimalists in their treatment of security affairs. Japan's current security policy is the result of political maneuvering within the Diet, with the government regularly yielding to opposition party demands. It is not a well thought out, defined, or rational policy. [Ref. 155]

Sato goes on to state that the intent of the drafters of the Constitution was to prevent Japan from having military power only if its purpose was to invade another country. [Ref. 156] No Constitution could be valid if it denies a sovereign state the inherent minimum right of self defense. [Ref. 157] Also, Article 9 does not negate Japan's need to resist outside force. That rationale, to resist outside force, is the basis for Japan's security treaty with the United States and United Nations membership. Japan must have its own emergency capability to repulse attack, at least temporarily. He concludes by saying war potential does not mean the same thing as defense capability. [Ref. 158]

Former Prime Minister Nakasone states that there are two conditions which must be met for this reinterpretation to be enacted. First, Japan's independence and peace must be directly threatened, or the international community must be united in denouncing a country which has acted aggressively. Second, the reinterpretation should not extend to allowing the dispatch of the SDF to engage directly in fighting. [Ref. 159] Although the first condition is universal, some scholars would engage the SDF in fighting. The Yomiuri and Sankei newspapers both, through their editorials, advocated constitutional reinterpretation and the deployment of the SDF, and criticized Prime Minister Kaifu for waffling in front of the Diet on these two

points. [Ref. 160] PM Kaifu made a mistake when he told the Diet that he had no intention of reinterpreting or revising the Constitution. What he should have said, according to Kenichi Ito, was that in view of Japan's role in the Gulf crisis, we had no choice but to change the customary interpretation of the Constitution. [Ref. 161] Even if this gesture did not result in the deployment of SDF, Ito felt that at the very least it would have opened a debate which would have aroused the Japanese to a sense of their international mission and an awareness of national security. [Ref. 162] The Japanese must expand their defense horizon to encompass the global security dimension. For this, the Constitution must be reinterpreted.

The collective right of self defense (CRSD) is the tool for this reinterpretation. This is the approach taken by the newspapers and scholars advocating reinterpretation. In September, 1990, the Yomiuri newspaper advocated constitutional debate in order to form an appropriate response to the question of Japan's international responsibility. [Ref. 163] By October, it was stating that the interpretation of the CRSD as unconstitutional was not laid out in the Constitution itself, but rather the interpretation of successive cabinets, and that "either we recognize the exercise of the collective right of self defense limited solely to support of multinational forces, or work out new judgements that these are actions that

occur in a different dimension from the collective right of self defense" [Ref. 164]. These sentiments are also expressed by the Sankei newspaper in editorials in September/October 1990. [Ref. 165]

Seizaburo Sato, who previously served as national security advisor to PM Nakasone, has the following concept. In order for Japan to play an active role in maintaining global order, the Japanese must make a major shift in thinking on the right of collective self defense and the meaning of Japan's exclusively defensive stance. The collective right of self defense should be exercised in response to direct threats to Japan or an act of aggression widely condemned by the international community. Article 98 of the Constitution states that all treaties shall be faithfully observed, including the United Nations Charter. Japan's renunciation of the collective right of self defense is in fact an abdication of its responsibilities as a UN member. [Ref. 166]

A further restriction governing the SDF is the Self Defense Force Law. At present, the interpretation of this law has been whittled away by the opposition parties to a minimalist interpretation. It is being used as an excuse to avoid doing something undesirable. A broader interpretation of the law will make it possible for Japan to contribute militarily in the Middle East, and be a good temporary solution. The law must be revised in the long run. This was pointed out by the Sankei newspaper on September 27,

1990. [Ref. 167] The law must be amended to allow the SDF to provide logistic support overseas, participate in UN peacekeeping operations, and repatriate Japanese citizens. A few additions to the law could accomplish all this and, because the SDF Law is less vulnerable to parliamentary scrutiny, allow Japan to react to major crises with major actions.

A final tool which could be utilized to facilitate the deployment of SDF is the UN Charter. The UN Charter could pave the way for Japan to participate in peace keeping operations. The charter is consistent with the Japanese Constitution, both being derived from the same post WWII ideals. The charter can be utilized two ways. First, peace keeping operations within the mandate of the charter do not have to be considered self defense. It would be part of Japan's inherent diplomatic authority. Second, Article 2 of the charter renounces force, but Article 51 acknowledges member states' "inherent right of individual or collective self defense". This logic can be applied to the Japanese Constitution, too.

3. Internationalist Reactions to SDF Deployment Opposition

The next section of this thesis deals with the opposition to the deployment of SDF personnel. The Gulf War would have been an ideal opportunity for Japan to take on such

a role, especially as most of the world would have supported such efforts. For the Internationalists, to lose this opportunity would be a major setback. Additionally, Japan's subsequent failure to do so sparked severe criticism from other nations, most significantly the US. Such a result was predicted by the Internationalists. Therefore, a look at the criticism leveled by the Internationalists against those opposing deployment of the SDF serves to illustrate the strength of their belief that Japan should assume a greater international role.

First, the debate in the Diet will be reviewed. The opposition came mostly from the Japan Socialist Party (now renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan or SDPJ, but JSP will be used in this paper), with the Komeito visibly softening its opposition to the SDF. The former leader, Takako Doi, led the opposition debate in the Diet over the United Nations Peace Keeping Bill. According to Kenichi Ito, the debate focused solely on the constitutionality of the bill. [Ref. 168] It did not pose the questions of: a) the significance of the Gulf crisis to the world in general, and Japan in particular; b) what response Japan should make; c) whether Japan could respond sufficiently under the existing legal system and available resources; and d) what to do if Japan could not respond sufficiently. In other words, states Ito, it avoided the primary issue. [Ref. 169]

He goes on to say that throughout the JSP stance, all focus was on opposing the deployment of the SDF. No attention at all was given to Saddam Hussein or Iraq. To him, this indicates that the JSP pretends that such crises and problems do not exist. Ms. Doi thinks that the "no war structure" of the new world order will be ready made, and Japan does not have to make a contribution. Ito concludes by saying that at a critical stage where the participation of all countries is vital to whether or not the demise of the Cold War leads to an era of peace, Ms. Doi brings out the Japanese "no war constitution" which rejects precisely the required positive steps and acts like the Constitution was entirely responsible for causing the current world situation. [Ref. 170] Seizaburo Sato also laments this situation, saying that as long as the country's largest opposition party has this utopian dream, prospects for Japan are bleak. [Ref. 171]

Two major newspapers, the Asahi and the Mainichi, took up the position of advocating strict interpretation of the Constitution and opposing the deployment of the SDF. Kenichi Ito sharply criticizes them, saying that by using pretty words like Japan must make its "unique" contributions, the newspapers avoided recommending what specific steps Japan should take. [Ref. 172] At that point, the rhetoric of these papers clouded over. Both complained, but did not offer any constructive solutions. One example Ito

brings out is Asahi's proposal for a separate "Peace Cooperation Corps" (PCC) to be established separate from the SDF. However, in an earlier editorial, it had criticized the government for suggesting that unarmed members of the SDF be sent to assist in rear guard support operations. It queried "The government seems to be of the opinion that we are limited to rear guard support without the use of military force, but does this make any sense? Having been perceived as 'soldiers', can members of the Self Defense Force suddenly slip away from the battle line when hostilities begin without inviting the derision and distrust of other nations?" This criticism would most probably apply to Asahi's PCC, but the Asahi does not seem to notice this hypocrisy. [Ref. 173]

This brings up another point of debate: armed or unarmed personnel. Several suggestions arose for sending either unarmed soldiers or civilians to the Gulf to assist in rear guard actions. Eto queries what is the purpose of the SDF if not to protect Japanese civilians abroad. [Ref. 174] He is not the only one. In the first place, questions Okazaki, what happens when those civilians are exposed to danger? Will they be permitted to drop their duties and flee? If this happens, Japan will become the object of international scorn and contempt. [Ref. 175] In the joint journal article with Okazaki, Seizaburo Sato asks how the government can suggest sending civilians instead of the SDF? [Ref. 176] To

send civilians instead of the SDF is an affront to the members of the SDF. To him, sending civilians and diplomats to front lines, but insisting the SDF stay at home when that professional, well trained corps is available is just like saying the professional corps is useless. He brings up Okazaki's earlier point by adding that the government will feel obligated to remove those civilians as soon as danger threatens. [Ref. 177] To Motoo Shiina and Kenichi Ito, sending unarmed soldiers would have the same effect. [Ref. 178] In the first place, no one would go. Secondly, such civilian or unarmed troops would be a handicap to any commander. Civilians could not be relied upon to go into dangerous areas. Any force unable to defend itself would be another burden to be protected. As Ito sarcastically asks, perhaps JSP Secretary General Yamaguchi needs to think about such things before he makes suggestions to send unarmed soldiers or civilians. [Ref. 179] He goes on to state that self defense is a right, regardless of whether that person is civilian or military, and no one should be sent into a battle zone unarmed. Neither JSP nor Asahi denied that personnel must be sent. Rather, their bone of contention was whether or not this contribution could be military. [Ref. 180] However, Ito concludes, those personnel should have the right of self defense.

What about pacifism? The reasoning is: as the conscientious objector nation of the world, Japan can afford

to not participate. However, according to Seizaburo Sato, pacifism has its inherent dangers. The problem with Japan's pacifism is that it is "one country" pacifism. [Ref. 181] This pacifism, as pandered to by the opposing party and newspapers, is one in which the Japanese want to be the only ones who avoid all risks and keep a distance between themselves and danger. The "conscientious objector" commentators are just pretending to be so. They lack the positive will to pay the price, and fail to grasp the very concept of paying the price that must be paid for the privilege of objecting to military service. Uncompromising pacifism is for religious paragons. For ordinary individuals, Sato concludes, it is just another name for cowardice and defeatism. Kenichi Ito is more pragmatic. To him, conscientious objectors are looked down upon. [Ref. 182]

To Kitaoka, the reason for Japanese pacifism is obvious. Having built up a level of affluence, the Japanese do not want to give up what they have. A concern is that by holding on tightly now, Japan may lose much more in the long run. [Ref. 183] To Shiina, if Japan is seen as a conscientious objector on a global level, its very survival could be endangered. [Ref. 184] For Ito, Japan has become too important a nation to act that way, and the international system cannot function if Japan persists in its pacifism. [Ref. 185] To Sato, pacifism ignores the

fact Japan's own interests are threatened by the Iraqi invasion, and also ignores compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. Kitaoka summarizes the problem neatly. To him, pacifism is predicated on the willingness of somebody else to use force to defend Japan's freedom. The problem is that if Japan does not help others, no one will help her. [Ref. 186]

The final arguments for opposing positive action, as pointed out by Motoo Shiina, are that none is needed because Japan is too important. The first argument theorizes that if Japan will just toe the line and keep its role as a "mercantile" nation, things will work out. To Shiina, this argument ignores the fact Japan is enmeshed in the international community. It was previously allowed to exist as an economic giant because it took up a position as a Western bloc member, and played a minimal security role under the US/Japan security treaty. A country of merchants cannot earn respect as a nation. When a nation shows itself unable to join allies in time of crisis, it must resign itself to an outsider's role. [Ref. 187]

The second argument suggests that Japan will always find an ally in the U.S. as the two countries are so interdependent that Washington cannot afford to sever relations. Shiina counters by saying that unfortunately people, and governments, do not always behave in a purely

rational manner. This has been proven throughout history. [Ref. 188]

Action has to be taken. Inoki feels that failing to act in effect means condoning aggressive behavior. If Japan was the only country to take an anti-war stance, it might not be such a problem, but what if every nation acted that way? There will be no more international order. [Ref. 189] MP Nakasone states that by clinging stubbornly to its egoism of the past and thinking only of self interest, Japan will not win the acceptance of the rest of the world, nor perpetuate its prosperity. Anti Japanese sentiments will only grow stronger as long as Japan behaves like a passive bystander. [Ref. 190]

4. Internationalist world view

The internationalists see the post Cold War world in the following manner. As stated earlier, regional conflicts are not likely to disappear, and will also become more deadly due to weapons proliferation. Changes in the global situation and Japan's emergence as a major power have increased the importance of the U.S./Japan alliance, and have brought Japan to a turning point in its foreign policy. [Ref. 191] Also stated earlier was that the end of the Cold War and subsequent restructuring of the world order are issues that Japanese currently neither understand nor are interested in. These notions, according to

Taichi Sakaiya, must change. [Ref. 192] To Sato, Japan has become too big to avoid playing a political and military role in international affairs. [Ref. 193] Additionally, the Gulf coalition, which would not have been possible during the Cold War, offers new possibilities for maintaining order in the future. The end of the Cold War makes it easier to prevent and localize regional conflicts. [Ref. 194] Sakaiya goes on to state that Japan has a responsibility to deter and resolve regional conflicts. [Ref. 195] Up to now, Japan could say it had its hands full with countering the Soviet threat, but this excuse is no longer valid. [Ref. 196]

To the Internationalists, the fundamental change in the global situation is that the Soviet threat, as perceived by other countries, has diminished. From now on, a country will no longer be counted upon simply by virtue of its position vis a vis the Soviet Union. All over the world, countries are starting to wonder who their real allies are. [Ref. 197] A new trend is developing where countries cooperate internationally to ensure that justice prevails in the world order. [Ref. 198] This order is essential to Japan, as dependent as it is on global peace and free trade for its own prosperity. [Ref. 199] The task facing Japan is to join the other nations in establishing the rules for the framework of receiving peace, and to establish her position within it. [Ref. 200]

Therefore, Japan must shake loose its passive complacency, and step forward with an independent foreign policy.

What has been called an "independent" diplomacy in the recent past is merely "anti-American" foreign policy, according to Taichi Sakaiya. A truly independent foreign policy must be devised and implemented, one based on a long range strategy and designed to serve the interests of the country as a whole. [Ref. 201]

He goes on to state that a true foreign policy must encompass diplomacy, security, and economics. Japan must change its self-centered economic policies. Most Japanese are under the impression that they have a free market economy, but this is not the case. In fact, they have a bureaucratically guided economy, one where industry cooperates closely with government, but few Japanese realize this. [Ref. 202] As one of the greatest beneficiaries of the multilateral free trade system, Japan will also be one of the most seriously damaged countries should protectionism raise its head on a global basis. [Ref. 203] Ito also feels the same way. To him, Japan must effect complete liberalization of its markets. It can no longer bask in the indulgence of other countries. [Ref. 204]

While the preceding paragraph could be greatly expanded upon, the focus of this paper will remain on security. Up to now, Japan has taken advantage of "burden

sharing", which enabled it to take up less than its fair share of the security problem as long as it paid its dues. Sakaiya likens this to "expense account" thinking, entertaining the other party and hoping he forgets the primary issue. But from now on, Japan must join in "decision sharing". [Ref. 205] Other Internationalists state that Japan can no longer avoid military issues. There is no way the international order can be maintained without military power. [Ref. 206] It can no longer duck the collective defense issue. As a major power, Japan has both the right and duty of collective self defense. [Ref. 207] Granted, Japan cannot become a superpower. However, regional conflicts are of global concern. Japan could help in deployment of conventional forces and logistic support. As she can do this relatively easily, Japan should expect to receive requests for such in the future. [Ref. 208] The need henceforth is for the government to amend its stance in the direction of permitting the deployment of the SDF on a wider scope.

Why the SDF? As stated earlier, a nation that wants to be part of the international community must contribute to world order and peace. Sending the SDF, even in indirect military roles, will show Japan's determination to fulfill its obligations. If not, other countries will begin to question Japan's substance as a nation. [Ref. 209]

To the Internationalists, now is a good time to establish a greater role for Japan. Utilizing the demands for Japan's greater security role will make a breakthrough in resolving the dilemma of Japan's security shyness. [Ref. 210] The Japanese people are beginning to support a larger role, as evidenced by the fact 3 out of 4 Japanese supported the decision to deploy minesweepers to the Gulf. [Ref. 211] The Japan Defense Agency should start its own overseas diplomacy in order to obtain other countries' trust through dialogue and consultation not only about Japan's image, but also addressing the deployment of the SDF. [Ref. 212] Given that Japan must establish a wider role for herself in global security, what are the steps to be taken? Japan's security policy has been linked to the United States. The question to be answered is whether or not this relationship should be abolished or modified.

As stated earlier, Japan has basked in the benevolence of the US nuclear and security umbrella. Although Japan must take on a greater role, the Internationalists strongly feel that it is critical that the close alliance with the United States be maintained. The US/Japan Mutual Security Treaty guarantees that the US will act on Japan's behalf. This guarantee is not present in the UN charter. Therefore, Japan's security must depend upon her alliance with the US, not the UN. [Ref. 213] If nothing else, the Gulf

crisis has created a renewed awareness of the United States' leadership role in the post Cold War world. [Ref. 214] The US effort to establish a multilateral framework marked a revolutionary development in the approach to controlling international conflicts. [Ref. 215] American "idealist" foreign policy is great, but may very soon wane. [Ref. 216] Combined with the perceived downfall of Communism, the US criteria in selecting its allies may well change. [Ref. 217] The light in which the US, and other countries, view Japan can very well determine Japan's future. If the image is bad enough, Washington may move towards policies which are not even in its own best interest, given the interdependence between US and Japan. Once this shift takes place, there is no stopping it. [Ref. 218] Japan is dangerously close to that situation now. During the Gulf crisis, the US was looking for a heart in allied nations, a heart that understood the great significance in the shedding of American blood for the sake of world peace. Japan did not show that heart. [Ref. 219] By contrast, the United Kingdom did. Immediately prior to leaving office, former Prime Minister Thatcher "castigated the other Western allies for their laggard response to the Gulf crisis and warned that unless they cooperated actively they would force the United States into an isolated leadership position." [Ref. 220] Japan paled in comparison.

Indeed, Japan's lack of response and reluctant action could very well be taken as signs that Japan is considering ending its alliance with the United States. The results could be disastrous.

The Internationalists feel that Japan has become too big to avoid playing a military role in international affairs. As the United States cannot go it alone without the support of its allies, its expectations of Japan will only become stronger. [Ref. 221] Japan must help in forming new policies in preserving world peace. Not only is the danger of regional conflicts high, but the Soviet threat still exists. Japan can help the US counter that threat by bearing a major portion of the burden of maintaining the military balance in her region. [Ref. 222]

In the eyes of the Internationalists, the alliance with the U.S. is significant for other reasons as well. First, Japan lacks the ability to defend herself on her own. Therefore its security depends on US resolve. If the US begins to doubt that Japan is a true ally, Japan cannot count on its help. [Ref. 223] Second, the treaty provides the best assurance that neither Japan nor any other Asian power steps out of line. This is because as long as the alliance is in effect, Japan cannot tilt in a hawkish direction. Finally, Japan must recognize its own history vis-a-vis its Asian neighbors. [Ref. 224] As long as Japan ties its security setup to the alliance, Asian neighbors

will not worry as much. [Ref. 225] This was emphasized by Singapore Prime Minister Goh to Prime Minister Kaifu during the latter's visit to Singapore, and PM Kaifu acknowledged the necessity [Ref. 226].

One possible counterargument might be that Japan should emphasize the UN Charter as the cornerstone of its security policy. Motoo Shiina warns that the problem with the Charter is that it does not guarantee that the Security Council will act on Japan's behalf should she be threatened in the future. Most people do not remember that the Security Council opposed Japan's entry into the U.N. for five years. [Ref. 227]

5. Internationalists and the Mutual Security Treaty

For the above reasons, the U.S. Japan alliance must be maintained. This does not mean, however, that revisions to the Treaty are out of the question. The problem is timing. Now is not a suitable time to be making changes to the treaty. Anti-Americanism is rampant among the Japanese public. The political atmosphere is highly charged, and a practical debate might not take place. Another caution, although specifically voiced in regard to changing Japan's Constitution, may very well also apply towards the treaty. Inoki Masamichi, chairman of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, cautions that a lot of voices calling for reform (to the Constitution) are pre WWII militarists, and that at some point in the

future, a more aggressive, younger generation will address this matter calmly and sensibly. [Ref. 228] This caution might also be applied towards any revisions to the security treaty.

In the meantime, although a revision to the treaty might be desired, it is not absolutely necessary for change to occur. In a response to the question of treaty revisions, Dr. Seizaburo Sato had the following to say to this author: [Ref. 229]

Question (LT Young): How should the Mutual Security Treaty be handled in the future?. Should it be maintained as is, or changed to a more "mutual" treaty?

Answer (Dr. Sato): I think it is desirable to change it (the US Japan Mutual Security Treaty) to a more "mutual" one. But even so, no change is absolutely required. It is possible to interpret the treaty in a flexible manner, and thus utilize the treaty. Although Americans tend to favor a legalistic approach and always want to change laws, Japanese are more practical. The law does not have to be changed.

Question: Should the treaty be changed eventually?

Answer: Yes. Of course. Towards a more equal treaty, not one-sided as it currently is. That has got to be better. But that doesn't mean that nothing can be accomplished until the change takes place.

6. Internationalists' Agenda

This brings up the next question. What sort of changes should take place? One factor is actual military strength. Regarding the actual makeup of Japan's military, several options are presented by the internationalists. At one extreme is Tetsuya Kataoka, a Japanese national and senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He recommends Japan "purchase" the U.S. Seventh Fleet and provide protection for 3000 miles of sea routes. The U.S. would then just maintain its Third Fleet for Pacific security, and rake in the profits from the major fleet sale to help offset the trade deficit. Joint U.S./Japan fleets would then deploy to the Indian Ocean as required. [Ref. 230] A look at the map shows that resultant peacetime Japanese coverage would have JMSDF destroyers off Hawaii and JMSDF P-3's at Diego Garcia. Although he mentions that the new relationship would not threaten other countries in the region, the U.S. might add itself to the list of threatened countries. [Ref. 231]

Professor Sato advocates a six point agenda which contains the following items: [Ref. 232]

1. Enhanced Wide Area Surveillance Capability: involving closer integration of existing air, ground, and sea surveillance systems, acquisition of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), over-the-horizon Radar (OTHR), and surveillance towed array sensor system; all closely integrated with U.S. systems.

2. Enhanced Extended Air Defense Capability: achieved by acquisition of new, improved three dimensional radar, more F-15's, Patriots, AWACS, airborne tankers, V/STOL carriers, AEGIS ships, and an anti-tactical missile system. This would enhance the ability of the U.S. and Japan to act as one to defend the islands, deter threats, and secure reinforcement routes from the U.S.
3. Enhanced ASW capability: achieved by acquisition of P-3 update III, SH-60, and SURTASS; and improvements in antisubmarine torpedo, surface vessel, and submarine capabilities. This will be combined with an ASW center for quick analysis and development of tactics. This reflects the Soviet deficiency of reliance on land-based air. The main threat outside that sphere of coverage would be attack submarines. Significant improvements here would effective deterrence.
4. Enhanced Defense Capability of the Japanese Islands: through strengthening bases, increasing stockpiles, and promoting further integration between the three services.
5. Wartime Host Nation Support: to support the tactical actions of U.S. forces during wartime on the Japanese islands and in the surrounding regions. Although significant support exists now, during peacetime, wartime augmentation must be planned and ready to be implemented.
6. Joint Weapons Research, Development, and Production: in order to maximize efficient use of technology advantages on both sides, and to promote increased interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.

As can be seen, the main theme of his plan is to complement the U.S. to the greatest extent possible. This concept, complementing the U.S., is also promoted by most other internationalists. They strongly feel that rejecting the U.S. alliance would inevitably lead to Japan's full scale rearmament, which would not be tolerated by other countries. Especially vocal is Mineo Kyudai, an international military affairs commentator. In a rebuttal to MP Ishihara's book, he takes issue with MP Ishihara's comment that Japan could

maintain an adequate defense capability with current defense spending levels. Kyudai states:

Actually the exact opposite is true. Japan would have to embark on the construction of a full-scale military establishment, shouldering all the uneconomical costs such an undertaking would entail, and it would have to supply by itself all the reinforcements it can now expect from the United States. As nearby nations turned their back on Japan, meanwhile, we would find ourselves in an increasingly vulnerable position of global isolation, necessitating the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Military spending would inevitably mount to astronomical heights. [Ref. 233]

Regarding the Neo-Nationalists' world view, he says the following:

Especially since World War II, defense has come to be a collective endeavor under a single superpower. Those who find this intolerable, who would make Japan the leader and the United States the follower, would only guide us toward a second Pearl Harbor. People like Ishihara fail to see this broader picture. Perceiving Japan-U.S. relations from solely a nationalist viewpoint, they treat American calls for increased Japanese spending in one area or another as unfair and unreasonable requests. Thinking that they are being insulted, they lash back with charges of American racial prejudice. Their fundamental error is a failure to understand the necessity of alliances in current military strategy. Coupled with their emotional nationalism, this leads them to see the mutual security setup as an irrational structure. But as I have demonstrated, their concept of an independent defense setup does not stand up. For contemporary Japan, it is a mere illusion. [Ref. 234]

7. Revising the Security Treaty

This brings the study to its final section, proposed revisions to the security treaty. One realization which gradually became apparent as this author undertook the research for this thesis was the fact not one of the Internationalists mentioned in writing that the U.S.-Japan

Mutual Security had to be revised. Many Internationalists talk of revising the Self Defense Forces Law, and even re-interpreting the Constitution, but not one touched upon security treaty revisions. The only hard evidence that could be found was an answer by Dr Seizaburo Sato given to a direct question by this author during the course of an interview. The only people to state in writing that the treaty needed revision were Neo Nationalists and they want to scrap the treaty.

This enigma gives rise to several questions. First, is the question of treaty revision a taboo subject for Internationalists? Possibly. After all, treaty revision is the current distinguishing feature of Neo-Nationalists and the last thing an Internationalist would want would be to be labeled as a "Neo Nationalist."

Second, is the treaty suitable for modern Japan? The answer is no. Internationalists claim that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty freezes the state of international relations circa 1960. [Ref. 235] Kazuo Ijiri, editorial writer for the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, likens the treaty to one befitting what he calls a "small" country. His point is that when the treaty, which commits the U.S. to defend Japan but not vice versa, was signed, Japan was a minor country in terms of economic strength. The treaty was therefore proper at the time. Since then, Japan has developed into an economic

superpower, and the treaty is no longer suitable. In his own words:

As long as Japan was inconspicuous both militarily and economically, it was of course quite proper for us to act accordingly. But it is grotesque for a country that has grown into an economic superpower to continue to play the part of a helpless weakling. In order to avoid coming to terms with this incongruity, we have clung all the harder to pacifism. Pretending to be weak and proclaiming our pacifist ideals has been the easiest course for us. But we can hardly expect other countries to enjoy this bizarre performance, especially since our shrinking away from military conflicts is accompanied by such aggressiveness in our economic expansion. What has our pacifism accomplished?...Along with the idea of "little Japan," pacifism should have been abandoned at some point during the course of our growth into a major economic power. [Ref. 236]

Assuming that the Internationalists feel the treaty, in its current format, is unsuitable for modern Japan, why are they not proposing specific revisions to the treaty? Perhaps the answer lies in necessity. Although treaty revisions are desired in the long term, they are not needed immediately, and should be deferred until after Japan has grasped a larger international role and has a clearer vision of a long term strategy. To revise the treaty in the current atmosphere of charged public and political attitudes while Japan's future role is still poorly defined might actually be counterproductive. In the meantime, flexible interpretations of existing law will suffice in order for Japan to expand her international role. This was alluded to by Dr. Seizaburo Sato, as quoted earlier in this study.

Therefore, the final point to discuss is how Japan will go about expanding her role. While political and economic role expansion can be discussed at length, this study will, in interest of brevity, concentrate on military role, specifically the use of Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF).

Japan has two laws which strictly govern the use of the SDF. These are Article 9 of its Constitution, and the SDF Law. Article 9 states that Japan renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. [Ref. 237] However, the Constitution can be reinterpreted. As indicated earlier, Japan's Constitution and laws can be interpreted minimally or maximally. The minimalist derivation of Japan's security policy is not what was originally intended.

The intent of the drafters of the Constitution was to prevent Japan from having military power only if its purpose was to invade another country. [Ref. 238] No Constitution could be valid if it denies a sovereign state the inherent minimum right of self defense. [Ref. 239] Also, Article 9 also does not negate Japan's need to resist outside force. That rationale, to resist outside force, is the basis for Japan's security treaty with the United States and United Nations membership. Japan must have its own emergency capability to repulse attack, at least temporarily. War potential does not mean the same thing as defense capability. [Ref. 240]

As stated in an earlier section of this thesis, Internationalists feel that Japan can currently expand her international security role utilizing flexible interpretations of existing law. Revisions to law do not need to take place immediately. They can be deferred.

The same logic, flexible interpretation, can also be applied to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. For example, suppose Japan was under attack by a hostile power. At the same time, U.S. naval vessels enroute Japan were also attacked. Because those vessels were directly related to Japan's defense, ASDF aircraft and MSDF ships could engage those enemy aircraft. This was an actual test case put before the government in 1983. [Ref. 241] Although the judgement was ultimately decided to be an exercise of individual self defense, the test case reflects a desire to legitimize collective self defense. [Ref. 242]

D. CONCLUSION

As outlined above, there exists within the Japanese right a fertile debate regarding Japan's security policy and relations with the United States. Within this debate, the Internationalist school has been credited with occupying the center stage in policy discussions, and increasing their influence over the last two decades. [Ref. 243] The collapse of the Soviet Union and Gulf War have served to intensify this policy debate. Although a recent Army study by

Eugene Brown concludes that public indifference and porkbarrel politics will thwart the opinion leaders for quite some time, [Ref. 244] the author differs with Brown's conclusion. The Japanese public has a greater awareness of what is happening in the world around them. Perhaps the rise in "anti-Americanism" is a symbol of this new awareness. Increasingly, the Japanese are becoming aware of problems within their own country. The author's research in Japan in December, 1991 has clearly revealed this new awareness. Political powers must sooner or later account for this new awareness.

IV POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S ROLE

Assuming that Japan may soon seek to expand her role in the world, the question to be raised is: Where? Professor Nakanishi Terumasa states the following:

As the turn of the century nears, many Japanese will find it increasingly difficult to resist the lure of the "Asian option." For at least three reasons, they will be tempted to join forces with their East Asian neighbors. One is that the region is fast becoming an interdependent economic zone, and the horizontal division of labor among the counterpart industries in each country is expected to develop. Another is that a multipolar political order is taking shape in the region, and in such order Japan can expand its role. The third is that the generation of anti-Japanese Asians --or perhaps I should say Asians suspicious of Japan-- will gradually pass from the scene. Along with the changes in industrial structure, this should create more opportunities for partnerships with people in other East Asian countries.

Given this context, the new order should give Japan the chance to renew its identification with the rest of Asia at the same time as it shoulders more responsibilities in the global community. Provided that we set a sufficiently long time frame for the endeavor, Japan can draw closer to other Asian countries without hindering the formation of a more mature global perspective. [Ref. 245]

To be sure, nowhere in his article does Professor Nakanishi mention a military role for Japan. However, his statement does provide an avenue to explore. While many studies have been written about Japan's economic role in East Asia, this thesis is focused upon Japan's security role. Previous sections have argued that Japan might well expand her security role, past her immediate territories and surrounding waters, to a more international role. For some, the logical

scene for this expansion may seem to be East Asia. For that reason, this section of the study will examine prospects for an expansion of Japan's regional security role into East Asia. Once again, Asian opinion leaders will be studied. The difference is that other Asians will be focused upon, not Japanese.

A. NORTHEAST ASIA

In order for Japan to carry out such actions as proposed above, the key element concerned is the opposition of other countries. As far as Northeast Asia is concerned, Japan's options are closed. Japan's immediate neighbors suffered greatly at Japan's hands and are not likely to forget. Korea has especially bitter feelings towards Japan, and the dislike is mutual. Taiwan's memories are that of Nationalist China. Additionally, these two countries are further irritated by increasing trade deficits with Japan, enough so that the two countries are attempting to combine their resources in order to counter Japan. Their dissatisfaction with Japan is so great the two countries are overlooking the fact they are likely to become political and economic rivals in the very near future. [Ref. 246]

Finally, there is China. China's fear of Japan is illustrated by strategist Chen Xiaogong's comment in the Liberation Army Daily in September, 1990: " One cannot rule out the probability that Japan and a unified Germany will

develop into global military powers. Japan now has 300,000 troops, of whom 70% are officers and non-coms...(and) already possess the economic, scientific and technical potential...to leap over the nuclear period and develop intelligent non-nuclear space weapons." [Ref. 247] Even more indicative was China's reaction to the deployment of JMSDF minesweepers. Although Japan's efforts received favorable reactions from most nations in the area, China was an exception. China regarded this as a dangerous first step towards an increase in Japanese military activity overseas. [Ref. 248]

It appears Japan's options here are fairly limited. Historical differences and trade disputes make an expansion of Japan's security role extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, in Northeast Asia. The study will now move to the next possible arena.

B. SOUTHEAST ASIA

The key to Japan's efforts to expand her security role lies in the ASEAN nations. Not only is the Southeast Asian experience with Japanese aggression shorter and relatively less odious than Northeast Asian nations, but these same countries see Japan as a vital component in their own development. An excellent example is Malaysia's "Look East" program. Finally, these countries exhibited friendly

attitudes towards Japan during the hard times following the Gulf War, when friends were scarce.

Throughout the ASEAN capitals there was a general approval of the JMSDF's first operational mission beyond territorial waters since WWII. Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir accepted Japan's decision to deploy the minesweepers and allowed the flotilla to visit Penang. [Ref. 249] The Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alata made a public comment that Japan was acting within her rights. [Ref. 250] Singapore Prime Minister Goh, as stated earlier, voiced public approval for Japan's decision. [Ref. 251] This sentiment also extends to future deployment of the SDF. A leading Indonesian claimed that as long as there is prior notification and consultation, there would be no problems raised. [Ref. 252] Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has stated that he sees Japan's increased security role in the region as "inevitable" and that he accepts it as long as the US/Japan treaty remains in effect. [Ref. 253]

Some recent occurrences demonstrate that both Japan and ASEAN recognize their future relationship. Prime Minister Kaifu's trip to the ASEAN nations was highly indicative. During his policy statement given in Singapore on May 3, 1991 he stated, "Amidst these changing times, I feel acutely that Japan is expected to make even greater contributions in the Asia Pacific region - not only in the economic sphere but in the political sphere as well." [Ref. 254] What PM

Kaifu was hoping for from his trip through Southeast Asia was a mandate from ASEAN to adopt a more active role for Japanese PKO's, and to be able to decide the extent to which Japan could back up its economic role in the region with a security presence. [Ref. 255] Another example is Mahathir's invitation to Japan to become the leader of his proposed East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG), while suggesting that the EAEG also embrace security matters. [Ref. 256] Finally, in August, prior to the beginning of the ASEAN post-ministerial conference (PMC), Tokyo notified ASEAN that it intended to propose a framework for the discussion of security in the region. [Ref. 257]

Southeast Asia is not without its own security problems, either. Since the end of the Cold War, many thought that a new era of peace had begun. The Gulf War proved them wrong. The world is, in some ways, a more unpredictable, dangerous one. This is especially true in Southeast Asia. The East/West conflict was not the only conflict in the region. There are many more. Now that the relatively stable atmosphere wrought by the fairly predictable and easily defined Cold War tensions is gone, major changes will take place. Older conflicts, previously buried by the dynamics of the Cold War, will soon arise. A later section of this chapter will serve to illustrate some of these conflicts. These new tensions will necessitate that the nations of ASEAN

find a new way to ensure their continued peace and prosperity. The key to the new way could very well be Japan.

What the remainder of this chapter seeks to suggest is that Japan may be allowed to assume a far greater military role in Southeast Asia than she currently holds. Until now, Japan's role has been purely economic. Should, in the near future, Japan seek to expand her actions to encompass both political and military roles, the nations of Southeast Asia might permit, even encourage, this change.

However, an unilateral expansion will not be permitted by regional governments. Memories of Japan's odious conduct during WWII are very strong. However, within the framework of the US-Japan security treaty, and if seen as a way of keeping the US engaged in the region, things could be very different. The combination of Japan's new found internationalism and her neighbors' concurrence could bring about resounding change.

However, the people of Southeast Asia must first welcome Japan's new role. Their thoughts, their writings, and their actions may reveal if such an welcome is indeed present.

To illustrate the above, this section is organized as follows: a. identify tensions outside ASEAN; b. outline the need for military buildup; and d. examine a potential security role for Japan.

1. General Overview

"Change brings with it new opportunities but also many new uncertainties." [Ref. 258] This Singaporean quote illustrates the concerns which have emerged since the end of the Cold War. The new era may have brought peace, but it also unleashed new competitive forces that could redefine international stability. One excellent example was brought out by Singapore's Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. He felt that the emergence of three trading blocs, each based on dollars, deutschmarks, and yen, would mean a world fraught with conflict. [Ref. 259] In terms of international security, the passing of the Cold War generated three kinds of tensions: countries are no longer able to play one superpower off against the other; superpower entente might be detrimental to the self interests of middle powers; and the possible withdrawal of superpowers may provide an "window of opportunity" for regional powers to become more assertive and independent. The end of the bipolar world may release other destabilizing forces that can no longer be managed as they were in the past.

This is especially true in the Asia Pacific region. Within this area, not only are sources of regional disorder likely to persist, but a vacuum created by superpower withdrawal could be filled by aspiring regional powers like Indonesia, Vietnam, China, Japan, or India. The United States may not always be so friendly, either. Once Asian Pacific

nations are not regarded as strategic bulwarks, the U.S. may consider it necessary to take tougher steps with those countries in order to defend its own interests. Therefore, ASEAN countries must do things for and by themselves in order to fill this impending vacuum.

Within Southeast Asia itself, there are several reasons for a dramatically different security environment which would supplement superpower military disengagement should it occur: [Ref. 260]

1. Escape from strife on mainland Southeast Asia is no longer possible.
2. Japan, despite stated disinterest, when viewed in terms of her security concerns over sea lanes and declining American security role, may be compelled to opt for a security role beyond her adjacent waters
3. Lack of common security perceptions among Southeast Asian nations.
4. Phenomenal increase of Indian naval strength, with the desire to play the role of regional power, cannot be ignored.

Thus, ASEAN countries will find it necessary to spend far more resources on force upgrading and expansion in order for those forces to play a meaningful national security role once the stabilizing aspect of the U.S. presence can no longer be taken for granted. All ASEAN governments are apprehensive of the unilateral and precipitate thinning out of US military presence in the region. The uncertain shape of the US presence following withdrawal of US forces from bases in the

Philippines, and the impact of those negotiations on other powers such as China and Japan, mean that ASEAN itself would increasingly have to accommodate discussions of security cooperation issues into its formal agenda. Indeed, this was finally accepted by ASEAN heads of state at the February 1992 summit meeting in Singapore.

Lastly, if there should be more than one aspirant for regional domination, a new type of regional rivalry may develop. A good example may be Sino-India rivalry. Both countries view Southeast Asia as strategically important for the security of what they see as their own legitimate interests.

2. Extra-ASEAN tensions

The first half of this section will deal with those countries outside the ASEAN organization which are increasingly viewed as regional powers. The three countries are: India, China, and Japan.

India, with her vast resources, industrial base, manpower, territory, and strategic location; has a unique opportunity to play a major role in the world. Especially significant is the great increase in her naval strength. Most of the recent additions have been offensive, power projection platforms. By the year 2000, India intends to field a naval force which includes 5-7 nuclear attack submarines and 5-7 light aircraft carriers, and has stated the intention to

overtake British and French navies in world ranking. [Ref. 261] Although recent budgetary problems appear to have delayed this process, her intentions must be noted and considered. Neither India's trade nor presence of overseas Indians warrants such naval force. Rather, the Indian Navy's expansion seems to be an offshoot of a larger political decision to give more muscle to India's foreign policy. "India perceives itself to be a great power destined to play a crucial role in international politics". [Ref. 262]

Such aims for the future and India's manifest desire to acquire great power status generates fears and tensions among Southeast Asian nations and could very well cause reactions from other powers, such as Japan and China, should India be perceived to be going beyond its legitimate strategic interests. India is expected to play a role as a major power. Its future naval modernization and reach may well reflect an interest which goes beyond the Indian Ocean. This, when balanced against her minimal security concerns in Southeast Asia, and the lack of a major threat (to India) from the region, gives rise to the concern that something else is afoot. One Malaysian viewpoint is that the Indian Navy, utilizing its bases at Nicobar and Andaman islands, is fully capable of blockading the Malacca Straits, and utilizing Port Blair as a forward base for South China Sea operations. [Ref. 263]

How does Southeast Asia fare in India's security perception? To India, Southeast Asia is a geographic extension of South Asia. Some Indians regard the entire area as a single strategic entity. Southeast Asia is also seen as India's access point to the great technological and economic development of the Asia-Pacific region. Even so, the chances of India forging a security relationship with ASEAN countries is slight.

How do the Southeast Asian nations feel about these Indian efforts? India's greatly strengthened bases in the Nicobar and Andaman islands pose a direct threat. Southeast Asian nations are fraught with internal conflicts resulting from various ethnic groups, one large group being Indians. Southeast Asia's proximity may therefore compel India to utilize gunboat diplomacy to protect its overseas Indians. G.V.C. Naidu, of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, has collected several quotes from leading Southeast Asians which illustrate that India is definitely perceived to be a major threat. His compilation is quoted below:

Indonesia was more explicit in identifying India in June, 1989, when at a meeting in New Delhi, Indonesia's naval chief, Admiral Rakefendo, formally conveyed to the Indian officials his government's concern over India's naval expansion. In an interview with Indonesian Times, Indonesia's former Deputy Prime Minister, Hardy, quoted Indian strategists who admitted India had the motives and intentions of expanding influence in Southeast Asia, and perhaps, to fill the vacuum left by the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the Western Pacific region. According to a Time report, an Indonesian army colonel

described his government as 'concerned' about India's longer-term intentions, explaining this to be the main reason for the Indonesian decision to build a large naval base on Sumatra that would provide quick access to the Bay of Bengal. According to former Malaysian Prime Minister, Ahmad Rithauddeen, India's growing naval capability to project power well beyond its borders has caused 'some alarm and concern in East Asia and Western Pacific... India must show its neighbors, including Malaysia and other countries in Southeast Asia, that it does not have any ambitions to interfere in regional affairs.' A Malaysian defence analyst, J.N. Mak has stated that 'India is very definitely looming larger on the defence consciousness of countries in this part of the world.' [Ref. 264]

Similarly, China is viewed with increasing concern. Whether weak, unstable, and factionalized; or united, strong, and assertive; China, due to her great size, population, military, and geographic location, will always have a great deal of impact upon the region. China is proceeding with military modernization, will soon have significant power projection capability into Southeast Asia, and is acquiring a wider, more effective range of conventional capabilities which would enable her to advance and protect her interests in the region. China has long regarded the South China Sea as critical for the following reasons: [Ref. 265]

1. Traditional trade route and gateway to the rest of the world
2. The perceived quantity of undersea resources to be exploited
3. Islands in the area can be used as base points to delineate a vast Exclusive Economic Zone for China

China has emerged as the new dominant actor in the South China Sea, having the most powerful indigenous navy in the region. To achieve control over the area, China is strengthening Hainan Island, from which it can project power more easily into the region. Especially enlightening is a look at the Chinese Navy. China has various reasons to be concerned with protecting her maritime interests: to discourage encroachment of her territorial waters (2/3 of which are in dispute as China claims most of the South China Sea); to permit exploitation of sea resources; to protect her fast growing coastal economy; to facilitate trade; and to feed her people with ocean fishing. [Ref. 266]

Since the early 1980's, China has added an open ocean training for her Navy, in preparation of her Navy's exercise of blue water power in the not too distant future. China has begun a three phase buildup program. The first phase, which she is currently undergoing, includes the following elements: [Ref. 267]

1. extending radius of operations to the first island chains
2. gaining rapid response capability
3. gaining amphibious power
4. gaining air protection and attack forces
5. achieving credible second strike nuclear deterrence capability

By 2020, China intends upon being a major sea power. Even now, almost all of the Chinese Navy's recent major exercises have been held in the South China Sea. China's 1979 invasion of Vietnamese proved that she was prepared to use military force as an extension of foreign policy. Because of such actions, various Southeast Asian academics see China's claims to the entire South China Sea region as proof of her intent to become the dominant actor in the area. [Ref. 268]

Malaysia has a history of conflict with China, and has always considered her as the greatest long term threat for two reasons. First, Malaysia's forty year insurgency was sponsored by Communist Chinese. Beijing has wooed the ethnic Chinese population in the past, its Communist ideology incompatible with Malay ideology, and China's "Middle Kingdom" mentality gives rise to the suspicion that China is continually seeking to dominate her neighbors. Second, during the last ten years the Chinese Navy has been considered a serious direct threat to the South China Sea, especially Malay interests in the Spratly Islands. Recent events have not helped much either. The U.S. is seen to be having a "love affair" with China. The decrease of tension along China's border with the former Soviet Union has freed the Chinese military from the danger of imminent attack, leaving it free to concentrate on the South China Sea. China's 1988 clash with Vietnam over disputed claims in the Spratly Islands gives

rise to the worry that Malaysia, with her own claims in the Spratlys, may also be on the target list.

Indonesia does not fare much better. First, Indonesia does not agree with the Communist ideology. Second, one of Indonesia's primary concerns is the large Chinese minority. China has a history of interference. During the 1950's and 60's, culminating in the bloody attempted Communist coup, increased conflicts between the army and the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) implicated China and overseas Chinese. The PKI received moral and material support from Beijing, and acted as champion for overseas Chinese against persecution from government officials. As such, anti Chinese sentiments ran high among the indigenous population, and Indonesia froze diplomatic relations with China in 1967 and did not resume them until 1991.

Thailand, which has no interests in the South China Sea, can afford to take a lighter view. Even so, the Sino-Thai friendship is one of convenience. Until 1975, Thailand distrusted China. The seeds of this distrust go back to 1949. Thailand's overseas Chinese have dominant control of the Thai economy and play a major role in it's development. Therefore, to keep Communist China's influence out of Thailand, Thai government recognized the Kuomintang government in Taiwan. China retaliated by supporting the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in its attempt to overthrow the Thai government. This hostility lasted until 1975. At that time, all of Indochina

fell into communist hands, and the Indochinese states became a direct security threat to Thailand. In order to offset this growing threat, Thailand established relations with the PRC. This was the first stage. In 1988, the Thai armed forces lost a major battle, Ban Rom Khao, with Laos. Realizing that it lacked the quantity and quality of weapons to fight a modern war, Thailand had to revamp its military. Bangkok felt the U.S. could not be depended upon to safeguard Thailand in anything short of all out war. Nor could it be a source of weaponry. U.S. arms were viewed as too expensive, due to both technology and shipping costs, and unreliable as weapons transfers are subject to Congressional approval, and take too long to get to Thailand. By contrast, Chinese weapons are cheaper, readily available, and rapidly delivered. Thailand therefore turned to China for help. For her part, China saw the opportunity to use Thailand as a channel to get arms to the Khmer Rouge, and readily agreed; and, at the same time, agreed to end support of the CPT. There remain some concerns, though. The end of the Cambodian conflict may change Sino-Thai relationships. Additionally, China could use its friendliness with Thailand to force it to not protest Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, thereby driving a wedge into ASEAN unity.

The final potential "external" threat is Japan. Rather than going into specifics of how Japan is resented by most ASEAN countries for her both WWII atrocities and

aggressive post-war economic singlemindedness, my purpose here is to contrast Japan with the other regional powers in terms of threat perception by the Southeast Asian nations.

Professor Julius Caesar Parrenas, Senior Political Economist with the Institute for International and Strategic Studies of the Centre for Research and Communication, Philippines, has compiled a country by country contrast of ASEAN perceptions of China and Japan. His findings are summarized below. [Ref. 269]

Indonesia

The lack of integration of overseas Chinese has led to their being considered an alien group, and has spawned tensions between them and the Malay majority. These tensions have been mixed with the suspicions prevalent among Islamic and military establishments that Communist China is making use of overseas Chinese to influence and dominate Indonesia.

Economic relations play a significant role in Indonesia's foreign policy, as Indonesia feels that bolstering its development enhances both internal and external security. As Indonesia's most important trading partner, Japan plays a positive role. In contrast, China is a potential competitor.

Malaysia

Ethnic tensions between politically predominant Malays and ethnic Chinese contribute to Malaysia's security concerns. China is seen as a potential destabilising factor in the region for two reasons; Beijing's ties with subversives, and perceived influence over the Malaysian Chinese community. China's claim to a large portion of the South China Sea poses a direct threat to Malaysian external security. Despite uneasiness regarding Japan's WWII activities and growing power, Japan's role has been largely supportive of regional stability. Japan is also Malaysia's most important economic partner, especially in boosting its economy and defense capability.

The Philippines

China's claims to the South China Sea, including some strategic islands claimed by the Philippines,

reinforce Philippine perceptions of China as an external security threat. More importantly, China's links with the Philippines' outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines increase this perception. Japan is viewed in a positive light because of its large economic role, which is perceived as contributing to Philippine development.

Singapore

Singapore's small size and dominance of ethnic Chinese are sources of instability. Even though China is not a direct threat, the dominance of ethnic Chinese are a destabilising factor in its relations with its closest neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, both of whom view ethnic Chinese with suspicion.

Hence, Singapore is wary of establishing close ties with China. Japan has become Singapore's most important economic partner.

Thailand

Thai perceptions of China depend upon its triangular relationship with both China and Vietnam. Although relations are good now, China is a traditional enemy, and changes in Thai-Vietnamese relations could easily lead to a change in Sino-Thai relations. China, due to its size and proximity, is also considered a potential threat to Thai security. Japan plays a significant role in Thai development. Additionally, Thailand does not share other ASEAN countries' negative views of Japan during WWII, having been allied to Japan at the time.

Additional emphasis must be placed on Indonesia. Within ASEAN Thailand, an economic powerhouse, and Indonesia, the population/size powerhouse, are probably the two most influential countries. While Thailand has actually supported Japan's military expansion, as will be outlined in a later section of this thesis, Indonesia has staunchly maintained non-alignment. However, should Indonesia have to choose between China and Japan, Japan will undoubtedly be the choice. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta, has contrasted the two. [Ref. 270]

China-represents the type of country Indonesia wants to avoid.

China has little to offer to Indonesia's development efforts, and relations with China have proved socially and politically destabilising. China may also subvert Indonesian overseas Chinese for its own political ends. Relations with China have been marked by confrontation.

Japan-represents the type of country Indonesia wants to cultivate close relations with. Japan is in a position to help Indonesia out economically and has not played a political role in the region and has not interfered in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Japan is expected to contribute to the development of Indonesia's national resilience as well as to the regional resilience as a whole.

Former Foreign Minister Ali Moertopo, as quoted in the Anwar article, also compared the two threats. He sees the threat from Japan as stemming from its economic aggressiveness, and the threat from China as stemming from its ideological aggressiveness. He argues that while Japan's economic aggressiveness can be channeled into national development, China's aggressive ideological threat is unusable, unabsorbable, and quite unnecessary. [Ref. 271]

In summary, Indonesia is afraid of China, not so much as a hostile power, but in light of Indonesia's own weaknesses which China might exploit. In contrast, Indonesia's view of Japan is one of ambivalence. If forced to choose between the two, Indonesia will thus likely choose Japan.

The next question to be addressed is how India compares with Japan in terms of Southeast Asian threat perception. India, in contrast to Japan, has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use military force in order to

assume a great power status. [Ref. 272] ASEAN countries are well aware of the military threat posed by India. Even Indonesia, the non-alignment state, has beefed up its defenses in response to a perceived Indian threat. Concerns about ethnic Indians in ASEAN countries also exist. Given the above, one can assume that Japan will also be the preferred choice in comparison.

The second half of this section will address the ongoing conflict in the Spratly Islands between ASEAN and non-ASEAN nations. This conflict is, and will remain, the primary source of major tensions, rivalries, and military adventurism.

The Spratly Islands, a collection of largely uninhabited islands spread throughout the South China Sea, appear to be headed for an era of naval conflict that will probably involve all ASEAN members. The islands are important for several reasons; strategic location, abundance of maritime resources, and possibly large oil/gas deposits. [Ref. 273] Five countries have claims in the area; Taiwan, PRC, Vietnam, The Philippines, and Malaysia. Of those five, three countries claim the entire archipelago. The Philippines and Malaysia have claims only on specific islands. Until 1988, the region was in relative peace despite the conflicting claims. All involved appeared to be avoiding armed conflict. First, a historical perspective to illustrate the region up to 1988. [Ref. 274]

Taiwan, whose claim dates to the first century A.D., has incorporated the entire archipelago into one of its provinces since 1946 (by the Kuomintang Government of China). Ten years later, it established a garrison of 600 on the largest island, and has maintained that garrison to date.

The PRC has claimed sovereignty over the entire archipelago since 1949, but did not occupy any islands.

Vietnam, whose claim dates to the early nineteenth century, announced its sovereignty over the entire archipelago in 1975. Since then, it has militarily occupied five of the islands.

The Philippines claimed about 60 islands in 1971. Its argument was that the islands it claimed, the Kalayaans, were not part of the Spratlys and therefore belonged to no one. Since 1975, it has maintained troops on various islands. One island, Pagasa, boasts a 1800 meter runway.

Malaysia, as a result of a mapping exercise in 1979, designated eleven atolls as part of her Exclusive Economic Zone. Three atolls have been occupied.

All was relatively peaceful until 1987. At that time, PRC declared that the Spratlys were part of the strategic border of Hainan Province, and started conducting naval exercises in the region. This prompted other nations to take actions in order to consolidate their holdings. More troops were dispatched. A conflict started brewing between the PRC and Vietnam. Vietnam charged the PRC of intrusion, and occupied more islands. China countered by occupying islands. The two sides finally clashed in March, 1988.

China emerged as the victor from that battle. Since that time, not only have other nations further solidified their claims, but China intensified its activities. By July of that year, the PRC had established a base in the Spratlys, maintained its military presence there, and has conducted numerous naval exercises in the region.

The Spratlys will continue to remain in conflict for quite some time. The great controversy lies in the fact that three nations have claimed the entire archipelago. For any of these nations to even engage in multilateral talks will immediately and inadvertently jeopardize their own claims by recognizing the fact other parties have legitimate claims too. The results of this are illustrated by the following quote from Chang Pao-Min of Lingnan College, Hong Kong. [Ref. 275]

"Precisely because effective occupation of vast areas of the archipelago remains a goal for all, and fruitful negotiation cannot be expected to begin, much less to bear results, in the near future, all parties, with the possible exception of Taiwan, are likely to continue to consolidate their gains in the archipelago and even to expand their respective areas of control in order to alter the status quo in their favour. Presumably, their immediate objective is to establish, as much as possible, a more or less integrated, delineable, and, therefore, defensible line of territorial control, if only to strengthen their respective bargaining positions at the negotiating table in the future. Such attempts or activities, however, are bound to generate tension and armed conflict between the various contending parties. At any rate, the contest over occupied islands and the scramble for still unoccupied islands is likely to continue and probably intensify in the immediate future. Although large-scale clashes are not desired by all nor affordable to any, small skirmishes are bound to occur from time to time, as one party edges into the perceived or actual territory of another."

3. Military buildup

The next point to address is whether or not a military buildup started in the area? If so, how does a buildup fit in with an unstable security environment? Until now, most of the nations' militaries have been land focused. Not only are

ground forces significantly cheaper than maritime forces, but domestic stability often takes priority in developing nations. Ground forces are a critical component in maintaining internal order. In order to identify a change in threat perception from internal to external, this section will take a look at maritime capabilities. A order of battle will not be presented. Instead, new trends are the focus here.

Malaysia has recently started to upgrade its maritime capability. [Ref. 276] She has stated an interest in acquiring fast attack patrol craft and up to six submarines. More ominously, Malaysia has decided to construct a major naval base in the Sabah district. Combined with the redeployment of naval assets from the Malacca Straits area to the South China Sea area, this signifies a shift in threat perception towards the South China Sea. The Air Force has also shifted its focus, developing a major air base on Peninsular Malaysia facing the South China Sea.

Singapore has also undergone a change. There has been a recent trend in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to emphasize the readiness to stave off major naval adversaries if necessary. [Ref. 277] In March, 1990, the SAF announced that it would be acquiring aircraft specifically intended for maritime patrol and reconnaissance. More and more of its aircraft are being reconfigured towards an anti-ship role. Finally, Singapore has equipped some of its

aircraft with aerial refueling capability, signifying the perceived need for long range maritime strike.

Indonesia has been previously mentioned to be strengthening her bases in Sumatra, and Thailand has recently announced its desire to field a helicopter carrier in the near future. All of these recent developments signify a major change in threat perception, from internal disorder to maritime force.

C. JAPAN'S ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

This final section bring us to a future role for Japan. The focus of this section is to point out various statements and gestures made by some leading Southeast Asians which indicate that Japan may be allowed to pursue a greater role in the future.

It is important, however, to state that the prospects for a greater Japanese military role in Southeast Asia are very slight. Southeast Asians would be vehemently opposed to such a role, and many have made it perfectly clear that while economic and political roles for Japan would be highly welcomed, an expansion in her military role will currently not be tolerated. This message seems perfectly clear.

What this section will argue is as follows. Should the ASEAN nations be forced to choose a regional power to maintain regional stability, there are three choices. Currently, India, the PRC, and Japan are the only regional nations even

remotely capable of carrying out such a role. Each choice has its inherent disadvantages. However, of those three options, Japan may be the least objectionable. Japan, despite her history of aggression, has contributed greatly to the economic welfare of Southeast Asia. When contrasted with the other two nations, Japan has not embarked on any military adventurism in the last half century has been benign. This is the argument that this section will seek to synthesize from the writings and statements of some Southeast Asian opinion leaders. Admittedly, the following quotes express the views of opinion leaders who are generally sympathetic to a larger Japanese role.

Malaysia:

Tan Sri Mohammed Ghazali Shafie, former Foreign Minister of Malaysia, has the following to say: [Ref. 278]

"For Japan, this is a unique moment in her history to seize the opportunity to define a vision of world political and economic order and assume her legitimate role in within that order." "While I appreciate the Japanese cultural tendency to decline the role of leadership because of the sense of guilt and shame as a result of war crimes...I think Japan and her people must face the fact that Germany also committed her share of military atrocities. Yet Germany and her people do not behave the way Japanese do. Japan must snap out of this complex..." "Japan receives the esteem of Asia, yet one detects a reluctance to do more on her part. Asia is in need of direction; it is a continent that needs to pool its resources and do great things together."

Muthiah Alagappa, of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, wrote in 1988 that: [Ref. 279]

"...a Japanese military role in the region is, for the moment, not necessary and, for many, not desirable. In the long term, however, a Japanese security role in the

region may have to be considered, especially by the ASEAN countries, due to the eventuality of a substantial reduction of the U.S. presence in the region as well as the continued Soviet and possibly also Chinese military presence."

Malaysia's Mahathir, in early 1991, accepted Japan's decision to deploy minesweepers to the Persian Gulf and allowed the flotilla to visit Penang. [Ref. 280] He also invited Japan to become the leader of his proposed East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG, now EAEC) and suggested that the EAEG also embrace security matters. [Ref. 281]

Indonesia:

Jusef Wanandi, Chairman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia, feels that Japan cannot be trusted if the U.S.-Japan alliance is broken. Even so, as long as the alliance is maintained:

"it would be in the best interests of the ASEAN countries to have Japan...take part in the collective security efforts of the U.N. Security Council." "In the event that the ASEAN members agree to establish some sort of collective security arrangement for the purpose of maintaining peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region, it would be desirable to invite Japan to contribute to the setup." [Ref. 282]

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, of the Centre for Political and Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, feels that while many of the apprehensions and concerned voiced are from civilians, important military leaders feel that Indonesia had nothing to fear from an increase in Japan's **non-economic role** (emphasis mine) in the region. In fact, there is a feeling that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining order and stability in the region. He has also compiled the views of several officials to that effect, two of which will be outlined below.

Former Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Soemitro felt that Japan, in the future, must accept the fact that it is also a major power with political responsibility to preserve peace and stability. He also feels that Japan could never be a threat unless Indonesia and other countries in the region tried to prevent Japan from using the sea lanes. Lt. Gen Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, former ambassador to Japan, argues that an increase in Japan's military might deter China's military ambition in the South. At the same time, Japan's economic dependence on imports would stem aggressiveness as gunboat diplomacy can no longer be used. Gen Sayidiman is so confident of this

that in 1983, he made the following statement in Japan: "As long as relations with ASEAN are smooth, ASEAN would not be threatened even if Self Defense Forces advanced into sea areas close to Southeast Asia and even if they undertook escort operations for U.S. carriers. Whether or not the strengthening of Japan's self defense power will pose a threat to ASEAN depends ultimately upon whether or not relations between Japan and ASEAN are stable." [Ref. 283]

Indonesia has expressed a desire for joint military exercises with Japan as early as 1971, when a joint air exercise was proposed between Indonesian and Japanese air forces. [Ref. 284] Although how Japanese planes were supposed to get to Indonesia was never addressed as Japan immediately declined, the gesture is still significant.

Singapore:

Prime Minister Goh voiced public approval for Japan's decision to deploy her minesweepers, and extended this approval to future deployments of Japan's Self Defense Forces. [Ref. 285] Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has stated that he sees Japan's increased security role as inevitable and that he accepts it as long as the US/Japan treaty is in effect. [Ref. 286] Singapore already sends officers to military schools in Japan.

Thailand:

Thailand is an outright advocate of an increased military role for Japan. She has shown an interest in receiving arms and military technology from Japan and already sends officers to military schools in Japan, [Ref. 287] and encouraged an increased military role for Japan as early as 1981. Surachai Sirikai, Dean of Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, states that Thailand and Japan's good relations extend back 600 years. Thai leaders view Japan's defense build up and a possible security role in Southeast Asia as contributing to regional peace and stability, [Ref. 288] and Thai elites in various quarters see an increase in Japan's security role as desirable in view of the decreasing U.S. role. [Ref. 289] Thailand feels safe as long as Japan continues its alliance with the US. He states that Thailand's support of an increase in both military strength and security role for Japan started in the 1980's, when Thailand felt threatened by Vietnamese intrusion, and has compiled the following to prove this point:

"For example, in September 1980, former Foreign Minister Bhichai Rattakui suggested that Japan should rearm in order to have an effective political role. In

January 1981, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila told Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki during his visit to ASEAN that Thailand did not fear the military resurgence of Japan and would welcome a Japanese security role in Asia. In November 1981, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda expressed the opinion that Japan should play an active role to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia. In May, 1983, Prem again lauded Nakasone's decision to expand the Self-Defence Forces and to patrol Japanese sea lanes up to a 1,000-nautical mile perimeter from Tokyo Bay, as a contribution to peace and stability in East Asia" [Ref. 290]

This trend has continued to date. In mid 1990, then Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan proposed a joint Thailand Japan naval exercise in Southeast Asian waters. [Ref. 291] Although the recent coup may have changed the country's leadership, the trend outlined above may not change.

The Philippines:

This country has emerged as the most recent advocate of a increased role for Japan. This is doubly significant in that the Philippines suffered more at the hands of the Japanese than other ASEAN nations. Secretary of Defense Ramos, visiting Japan in April of 1991, urged Japan to provide Southeast Asia with military technology. "We do not have any unusual fears about the ... alleged growing militarization of Japan" was his comment to the Foreign Correspondents club of Japan. [Ref. 292] He also hinted at defense arrangements between Japan and the Philippines, and that Japan should take a step by step approach to improving its defense relations with other Southeast Asian countries. At a meeting with the Director of the Japanese Defense Agency, he again suggested that Japan enter into more formalized security arrangements with the Philippines. [Ref. 293] To emphasize the point, Mr Ramos is a strong candidate for the 1992 Presidential elections.

One theme emerges from the above compilation. Japan is not regarded as a threat **as long as** the US/Japan Security Treaty is in effect. This ties in with the aims of the Internationalist school, whose proponents all stress the importance of the treaty.

D. ARGUMENT AND COUNTERARGUMENT

A development occurred in July of 1991 which, on the surface, would seem to break apart the theme of this paper. Japan's Foreign Minister, led on by perceived calls from ASEAN for Japan to increase her security role, proposed at the July Post-Ministerial Meeting that the association and its dialogue partners establish annual and formalized discussion at the senior official level on regional security issues. All of the ASEAN countries responded with hesitancy. The overall reaction was to acknowledge that security is a valid concern, but senior officials should not be discussing security matters. Japan had responded to ASEAN requests, only to find she was no longer wanted.

At first, it would appear that a security role was not desired. **However, ASEAN nations have long avoided discussing security relationships among themselves**, and it was not until the Singapore summit of February 1992 that a security dialogue was started.

Until the 1991 summit, ASEAN leaders resisted an ASEAN-wide alliance as it could intensify ideological-based polarization, conflicts within Southeast Asia, encourage the major powers to intervene, and stem ASEAN flexibility. [Ref. 294] Region-wide discussions concerning security have just started with the February 1992 summit. To date, even minimal regional defense cooperation, such as the standardization of weapons and regional self-

sufficiency in arms production, has not worked. It has not worked because of regional arms races, interservice rivalry, differing threat perceptions, various levels of defense spending, and different strategic priorities of each country based on location, territorial depth, and military doctrine. [Ref. 295] A maximum approach, a "defense community", is unlikely for several reasons. [Ref. 296] Each nation has a different perception of those countries which could become threats. Each nation is more comfortable in trusting its security to its ties with its external sponsor. Finally, for any ASEAN alliance to be effective, the alliance itself must be allied with a superpower, which will be contrary to ZOPFAN. Only the emergence of a significant, common external threat will force the ASEAN nations to ally among themselves.

This trend appears to be changing direction. The Singapore Summit of February 1992 heralded the start of security discussions at the region-wide level. In reality, Japan may have acted too hastily in 1991. In order to gain a military security role in the region, Japan must proceed slowly and cautiously. Bilateral ties with specific nations will most likely increase tensions and may even divide ASEAN. A mutually beneficial policy to follow would be to persuade certain ASEAN nations to invite Japan into the fold. Thailand and the Philippines may be the best places to start. They have openly expressed a desire for Japan to increase her

security role. If Japan allows those countries to lay the groundwork for a greater Japanese security role in the region, international and inter-regional criticism might be minimized. However, it is important for Japan to maintain its relationship with the U.S. This is the critical legitimizing factor that reassures the ASEAN countries that Japan's intentions are good. Without that qualifier, Japan cannot hope to expand her role.

E. CONCLUSION

As indicated in this thesis, the Southeast Asia region is by no means a safer region due to the demise of the Cold War. It may very well be a more dangerous region. Sources of tension are everywhere, and militaries in the region are increasing their capabilities. Of the three major regional powers, Japan has favorable relations with all of the countries. Should the need arise for some other Asian power to fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal, Japan will likely be seen as the best contender, or the least objectionable.

Japan will probably seek to extend her influence over the region. A new foreign policy generation in Japan, the Internationalist, is already demanding a new, greater role for Japan. When Tokyo decides to become fully engaged, Southeast Asia will be her primary area of interest. Japan already has

extensive economic penetration into the region. A military role cannot be too far behind.

It is important, however, to point out that most of the changes, notably the cessation of the Cold War, are relatively new, happening only within the past several years. Therefore, this conclusion is inherently speculative in nature. The focus is more upon possibilities, rather than definite events or actions. As the United States is highly involved and interested in both Southeast Asia and Japan, it is important to realize that these possibilities exist. Change will provide both opportunities and problems for the U.S., and it is extremely important not to be caught off guard.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

A. THE US PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this last chapter is to examine the U.S. view of Japan's role in maintaining security and stability in the Pacific region. The key word is "burden sharing." Currently, the United States maintains a very strong presence in Japan. The general American perception is that Japan is getting a "free ride" from the U.S. in terms of her own defense. This has enabled her to become the economic superpower that she is, and has contributed significantly to the decline of the US economy. Many argue that Japan should take a military role commensurate to her economic status, and take an active role in today's multipolar world, both militarily and economically. An ideal solution, from the US perspective, is that Japan should assume most, but not all, of the responsibility for maintaining security and stability in the Northeast Asian area. This can be accomplished by extending her SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) defense to the Formosa and Luzon Straits in the southwest, and significantly further along the trans-Pacific SLOC's. In addition to assuming a military role as would befit her economic status, the additional "share" would enable US forces to somewhat reduce its presence in Japan and assume a less active

peacetime role. Furthermore, US forces could then easily respond to contingencies not only in Northeast Asia, but in distant theaters without the need for maintaining a substantial presence in the Northeast Asia region.

It has been stated by many political and academic leaders that "the U.S. has no single relationship more important than our ties with Japan." [Ref. 297] Even Karel van Wolferen, one of Japan's "Gang of Four" (a name coined by leading Japanese to indicate four of the most prominent "Japan basher" writers) [Ref. 298] states that the United States' relationship with Japan is "beyond question among the most strategically important in the world." [Ref. 299] During the course of the last two years, the bilateral US-Japan relationship has come under severe scrutiny and become the focus of high level debates in both countries. This highly confrontational debate can be characterized by one word: trade. The issue of trade differences is nothing new. It has been around for two decades, since the textiles issue in 1960's. [Ref. 300] A significant change that emerged in most recent years is that of linkage politics; i.e. the joining of otherwise unrelated issues for bargaining purposes. [Ref. 301] Until the summer of 1987, the U.S. administration was firmly against the linkage of security and trade. The combination of the ongoing controversy of Japan's next generation experimental support fighter (FSX) and the revelation of Toshiba's sale of advanced propeller milling

machinery to the USSR forced the Reagan Administration to tie the two issues together. [Ref. 302] Starting in 1989, the prevailing view in the US government was that America's national security ultimately depends on its economic and industrial strength. [Ref. 303] This was evidenced by the entrance of non-Department of Defense agencies into the process of national security policy making, namely the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. [Ref. 304] "Japan-bashing" soon dominated the arena of bilateral relations.

This trend has continued to this day. Even in the light of Japan's monetary contributions to the Persian Gulf War, many Americans still tend to view the Japanese as free-riders as far as defense goes. [Ref. 305] In recent polls, 30% of the American respondents stated that they lost respect for Japan because of its behavior in the Gulf crisis. [Ref. 306] 73% thought that Japan got away without contributing its fair share. [Ref. 307] Numerous Japan-related bills and resolutions, of which three specifically dealt with her role in the gulf war, were submitted to Congress during the Gulf Crisis timeframe. [Ref. 308]

In order to maintain "desired" US-Japan relationships, it is crucial that Japan make a move to become a "senior partner" of the US. Failure to do so can only result in a continuation of the current trend of Japan bashing and reciprocal America

bashing. This may ultimately lead to a break between the two countries. The economic question has been the focus of many books and journals. This chapter addresses itself primarily to the question of security, but economic benefits which could result will also be outlined.

Is it in the best interests of the US to have Japan assume all of the responsibility for maintaining stability in the region? After all, the U.S. spends anywhere between 36-50 billion dollars annually for that purpose. [Ref. 309] The answer is NO. Japan already enjoys economic preeminence in East and Southeast Asia. This area, formerly noted for its chronic war and economic backwardness, is now one of the world's economically most dynamic and stable areas (with the exception of Indochina). The US might soon lose the powerful position of the area's protector and benefactor. The countries in the area are currently more concerned with economic progress than military threats. [Ref. 310] The economic rewards from Asia, which includes the NIC's (Newly Industrializing countries) are phenomenal for whoever can control the area. The power in control is starting to become Japan. In 1976, then Prime Minister of Japan Takeo Fukuda pledged that Japan would expand its economic, political, and cultural ties with the ASEAN countries. He then pledged \$1 billion in aid for the five ASEAN countries. Japan thereby replaced the US as the largest aid donor to Asia. [Ref. 311] By 1989,

Japan's influence in Southeast Asia has grown to the point its influence is starting to replace that of the U.S. Take, for example, the following comment from Asian Survey magazine's 1989 review issue:

The political reality is that as Japanese spending for investment and aid has grown in Asia and that of the U.S. has shrunk, both relatively (for investment) and absolutely (for aid), Japan's importance and influence has continued to grow in Asia, even in the ASEAN countries and South Korea which are uneasy about the trend. [Ref. 312]

Another good example of Japan's increasing influence is the 1991 coup in Thailand. The US immediately stopped \$16.4 million of economic aid. Japan continued \$614 million worth of economic aid. [Ref. 313] Which side was more influential?

US influence is still formidable. Japan has received quite a shock from the Gulf War. Fashionable post-Cold-War thinking had it that economic power was paramount, and Japan would be transformed into a new superpower, rivalling the US for influence. [Ref. 314] The Gulf War has proven that military power still counts in the post-Cold-War era. [Ref. 315] Military power is the US forte. This does not mean that the US should start brandishing its firepower all over the world. Legitimacy counts, as evidenced by the importance of the Gulf War coalition. [Ref. 316]

However, economic power still wields considerable influence. To have Japan assume an "enhanced" military

presence in Asia concurrent with her economic preeminence would be disastrous for the U.S. in terms of US influence over other countries. The U.S. would be "left out." The ideal solution would be to balance the influence of the two countries in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As outlined in an earlier chapter, although Japan may be allowed a larger role in protection of the region and the SLOC's leading to the area, this will be allowed only within the confines of the US alliance. Additionally, this role cannot lead to Japan building a massive war machine. [Ref. 317] These two restrictions will serve to effect a balance of influence.

Northeast Asia poses some further problems. Especially nervous are Japan's closest neighbors of China and Korea. Their response to Japan's debate about sending seven C-130 aircraft and support personnel to help airlift refugees in the Gulf region is highly indicative of the historical animosity in Northeast Asia. Despite being the recipient of massive investment from Japan, comments from China and South Korea bordered on hysterical, with China stating that Japan's proposal was a hidden effort to nullify its Constitution. [Ref. 318] A renewed sense of threat from Japan might possibly stimulate an arms buildup, not only in these two countries, but throughout East Asia. [Ref. 319]

The US/Japan alliance is what dispels the concern of Asian security, and the concern that Japan would fill the power

"vacuum" if the US withdrew. [Ref. 320] Australia and New Zealand are also worried about Japan's military capability. They both acknowledge the validity of sea lane defense, but would object to Japan gaining nuclear or long range bombing capability. [Ref. 321] Japan itself is conscious of these worries. As Japan's Political Minister to the US has stated: "Japan has the same need as any other country to build up defense capabilities to protect its own territory. In doing so, however, it must not ignore the sensibilities of the surrounding Asian countries." [Ref. 322]

SLOC defense is Japan's key rationale for a greater security role. The other nations recognize the importance of the SLOC'S, and Japan's interests in defending them. That would be the rationale for increasing Japan's defense capabilities. At the same time, Japanese force will not be permitted to either displace or overpower a US presence. The US must remain as a balancer in the region.

B. A "US" ROLE FOR JAPAN?

What, then, are the steps Japan could take to increase her security role in the region, but only to the extent which will be permitted by her neighbors? The main theme embraced by the internationalists, that of complementing the US as much as possible, would be one solution. There are some immediate economic benefits to be gained for the US. Most of the

additional hardware required is of US manufacture. The US also wants to tap into Japanese high technology. [Ref. 323] Continued integration with US forces would provide a rationale to allow the US to maintain bases in Japan. In a location where the US would be willing to pay for costs of stationing forces due to the strategic importance of the region, the Japanese pay most of the yen-based costs. In 1991, Japan contributed \$2.3 billion towards the cost of stationing U.S. forces by absorbing facilities cost and a percentage of labor cost. [Ref. 324]

The important thing that must be stated is that there will be no significant reductions on the US costs of its presence in Japan. The US presence in Japan is largely designed to maintain strategically located bases in that area of the Pacific, and a stronger Japanese defense will not reduce US desire to maintain its presence. However, a stronger Japan will contribute significantly to the stability of the region by increasing the flexibility of US forces, which is important to strategic mobility. [Ref. 325]

In turn, the US must accept its loss of absolute power and pursue a realistic reapportionment of responsibilities for regional security and prosperity. [Ref. 326] A combination of the America's still considerable strength, leadership experience and the economic vigor of Japan could dominate any threat in the region. [Ref. 327]

C. CONCLUSION

Will Japan do it? Given the right conditions, Japan will seek to increase her regional security role. The second chapter of this thesis brought up two trends in Japanese security policy, both of which will be addressed here.

First, Japan's security policy debate is responsive to her security environment. Japan's international environment continues to be harsh. [Ref. 328] The softening of East/West relations has not had as great an impact in Japan. The former Soviet fleet has continued to be an impressive array of hardware located close to Japan's shores. Russian policies and intentions remain largely unknown, further contributing to uncertainty in Japan's security calculations. Tensions remain high in the Korean Peninsula, and may reach a breaking point during Kim Il Sung's succession. Japan still depends heavily on her SLOC's. India continues to expand its navy far beyond what is seen as required, and most of Japan's oil flows just off India's southern tip. [Ref. 329] China has recently reinstated her claim over the Senkaku Islands, which were the focus of a dispute between Taiwan and Japan in 1990. [Ref. 330] China is also showing interest in purchasing an aircraft carrier from Russia. [Ref. 331]

Second, increasingly the Japanese discussion of Tokyo's greater security role stresses greater independence. Chapter III has shown that there is a growing perception that Japan,

as an economic power, must not only provide for her own defense, but also share a role in maintaining stability in the region. Increasing nationalism has promoted a desire for military strength. Most importantly, the increasing economic friction between Japan and the US has made the development of a more operational military alliance crucial to maintaining stable and friendly relations between the US and Japan.

Chapter IV outlines one possible means, a regional security role in Southeast Asia, which could be utilized by Japan to realize her greater role. However, the underlying condition which must be met is that Japan maintain her security relationship with the US. Without this legitimizing factor, Japan's neighbors will not permit any significant expansion of Japan's regional security role.

The key to Japan's future security role may well lie with the Internationalists. Their idea of Japan's future security policy is one of greater independence and regional scope, and which goes beyond UN sanctioned PKOs, but which retains the US/Japan Security Treaty as a essential component. Their policy framework matches the above conditions. Granted, the Internationalists themselves acknowledge the difficulties of promulgating their views. When asked how the Internationalists might take the reins of power in Japan, Dr. Sato replied that the only way is through an increased understanding (on the part of the Japanese people) of the rest of the world. [Ref. 332] Another traumatic event

like the Persian Gulf War might prompt an immediate change. Even without such an catastrophe, recent world events have served to slowly awaken the Japanese. His prediction is that within five years, Japan will be more actively engaged in international security affairs, particularly those affecting its regional neighbors. [Ref. 333]

Remarks of MP Tsutomu Kawara, former Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, and said by Internationalists to be an internationalist politician, [Ref. 334] are indicative of this probability.

Japan has a great international responsibility. The time has now come where Japan must welcome that responsibility. [Ref. 335]

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